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INTRODUCTION
Stop-and-frisk is a common and important investigative tactic for law enforcement officers across the United States.1 Controversially, however, stop-andfrisk morphed into an aggressive crime-control strategy quite different from the
tactic outlined in Terry v. Ohio.2 Part of this transformation is a function of courts
having expanded law enforcement authority to conduct stops beyond the limited
circumstances set forth in the Terry decision.3 But an equally, if not more important reason for this change in the use of stop-and-frisk concerns how urban
police departments began using the tactic in the early 1990s to combat the rise
in violent crime rates across the United States.4
No law enforcement agency used stop-and-frisk as a comprehensive crimecontrol strategy more than the New York Police Department (NYPD). The
NYPD engaged in approximately five million stops between 2004 and 2013,5
reaching an annual zenith in 2011 with 685,700 stops.6 The NYPD’s aggressive
1
MICHAEL D. WHITE & HENRY F. FRADELLA, STOP AND FRISK: THE USE AND ABUSE OF A
CONTROVERSIAL POLICING TACTIC 6–7 (2016); Henry F. Fradella & Michael D. White, Reforming Stop and Frisk, 18 CRIMINOLOGY, CRIM. JUST., L. & SOC’Y 45, 47–52 (2017).
2
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
3
Fradella & White, supra note 1, at 47–48.
4
Tracey L. Meares, The Law and Social Science of Stop and Frisk, 10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC.
SCI. 335, 337, 339 (2014).
5
Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda Geller, Following the Script: Narratives of Suspicion in Terry
Stops in Street Policing, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 51, 62 (2015).
6
CHRISTOPHER DUNN, STOP-AND-FRISK 2012, at 3 (Jennifer Carnig ed., 2013), https://www.n
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use of Stop, Question, and Frisk (“SQF”)7 as a broad crime-control strategy resulted in numerous lawsuits alleging deprivation of New Yorkers’ constitutional
rights.8 Two of these lawsuits in particular, Daniels v. City of New York9 and
Floyd v. City of New York,10 were certified as class actions that challenged the
NYPD’s use of SQF on two constitutional grounds—(1) that both stops and
frisks were made without reasonable suspicion in violation of the Fourth Amendment and (2) that officers selectively targeted people for stops on the basis of
race and national origin in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. After making extensive findings of
fact that relied heavily on sophisticated statistical analyses of the NYPD’s own
SQF data, a federal district court ruled that the NYPD had systematically engaged in unconstitutional SQF practices that targeted predominately Black and
Hispanic New Yorkers on the basis of their race and ethnicity.11
Research confirms the decisions in Daniels and Floyd in ways that leave
little doubt that Black and Hispanic New Yorkers were disproportionately targeted by SQF, resulting in them being far more likely than their White counterparts to be stopped, frisked, searched, and have force used against them by the

yclu.org/sites/default/files/publications/2012_Report_NYCLU_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/4N5R
-WBZZ].
7
We differentiate the particularized tactic of stop-and-frisk supported by reasonable suspicion under Terry from the New York City Stop, Question, and Frisk strategy by capitalizing
the latter and referring to it by the acronym “SQF.” We use SQF in the same way that law
professor Frank Rudy Cooper refers to “programmatic stop and frisk,” which he defines as
“(1) administratively driven, (2) pervasive, (3) data-enhanced area profiling, using the Terry
stop and frisk power, for (4) race-, gender-, and age-targeted police seizure and search of civilians with (5) the purpose of crime prevention.” Frank Rudy Cooper, A Genealogy of Programmatic Stop and Frisk: The Discourse-to-Practice-Circuit, 73 U. MIA. L. REV. 1, 6 (2018).
8
Stop and Frisk Practices, NYCLU, https://www.nyclu.org/en/issues/racial-justice/stop-andfrisk-practices [https://perma.cc/52YU-UY9B].
9
Complaint, Daniels v. City of New York, 1:99-cv-01695-SAS (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 1999); see
also Daniels v. City of New York, 138 F. Supp. 2d 562, 563 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
10
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 1–2, Floyd v. City of New York, 08-cv-01034SAS (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2008), http://ccrjustice.org/files/Floyd_Complaint_08.01.31.pdf [http
s://perma.cc/67YT-8H2A]; see also Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 556
(S.D.N.Y. 2013), stay granted sub nom. Ligon v. City of New York, 538 F. App’x 101 (2d
Cir. 2013), vacated in part, 743 F.3d 362 (2d Cir. 2014).
11
Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 562. The authors note that Judge Scheindlin was eventually removed from the case by the Second Circuit. Ligon, 538 Fed App’x at 102–03. Importantly,
however, the appellate court did not make any changes to her findings of fact or conclusions
of law. Id. And although the appeal was settled before resolution on its merits, Floyd et al. v.
City of New York et al., CTR. CONST. RTS. (Dec. 24, 2020), https://ccrjustice.org/home/whatwe-do/our-cases/floyd-et-al-v-city-new-york-et-al [https://perma.cc/9LLA-2SN2], it is clear
that Judge Scheindlin’s perceptions of the NYPD’s use of stop-and-frisk as an aggressive,
city-wide strategy for fighting crime were shared by many New Yorkers. Among other things,
William de Blasio was elected mayor in a landslide after having run on a platform to end the
strategy. See Michael Barbaro & David W. Chen, De Blasio Is Elected New York City Mayor
in Landslide, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/06/nyregion/deblasio-is-elected-new-york-city-mayor.html [https://perma.cc/55WN-CKYM].
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NYPD.12 When combined with the NYPD’s zero-tolerance approach against social disorder, SQF severely strained police relations with people of color and
their communities.13 And the social costs of the strain cannot be overstated.14
Although there have been improvements to address Fourth Amendment concerns attendant to SQF as a result of the changes Mayor De Blasio and his police
commissions implemented, questions of racial, ethnic, and sex biases still persist.15 For example, the New York Civil Liberties Union reported that of the
13,459 people the NYPD stopped during 2019, 59% were Black, 29% were Hispanic, and 9% were White, meaning that nearly nine out of every ten stops involved people of color.16 The present study seeks to unpack these figures by
12
Jeffrey Fagan, Garth Davies & Adam Carlis, Race and Selective Enforcement in Public
Housing, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 697, 706, 712, 718–22 (2012); Joseph Ferrandino, Minority Threat Hypothesis and NYPD Stop and Frisk Policy, 40 CRIM. JUST. REV. 209, 210–11
(2015); Amanda Geller & Jeffrey Fagan, Pot as Pretext: Marijuana, Race, and the New Disorder in New York City Street Policing, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591, 593–98, 601–07
(2010); Sharad Goel, Justin M. Rao & Ravi Shroff, Precinct or Prejudice? Understanding
Racial Disparities in New York City’s Stop-and-Frisk Policy, 10 ANNALS APPLIED STAT. 365,
366–67, 379–81 (2016); Philip J. Levchak, Do Precinct Characteristics Influence Stop-andFrisk in New York City? A Multi-Level Analysis of Post-Stop Outcomes, 34 JUST. Q. 377, 377–
80, 402–03 (2017); Weston J. Morrow, Michael D. White & Henry F. Fradella, After the Stop:
Exploring the Racial/Ethnic Disparities in Police Use of Force During Terry Stops, 20 POLICE
Q. 367, 368–69, 371–72 (2017); GREG RIDGEWAY, ANALYSIS OF RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE
NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT’S STOP, QUESTION, AND FRISK PRACTICES iii, xi–xiv, 8, 30
(2007).
13
Fradella & White, supra note 1, at 50; cf. Michael D. White, Henry F. Fradella & James R.
Coldren, Jr., Why Police (and Communities) Need ‘Broken Windows,’ CRIME REP. (Aug. 11,
2015), http://thecrimereport.org/2015/08/11/2015-08-why-police-and-communities-need-bro
ken-windows/ [https://perma.cc/GMV5-ZCT4] (explaining how SQF, as implemented by the
NYPD, strayed far from the central principles of Broken Windows Theory); see also Andrew
Ingram, Breaking Laws to Fix Broken Windows: A Revisionist Take on Order Maintenance
Policing, 19 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 112, 151 (2014) (similarly arguing that Broken Windows
Theory does not support the way that the NYPD implements SQF as a broad crime-control
strategy).
14
Fradella & White, supra note 1, at 51; CTR. FOR CONST. RTS., STOP AND FRISK: THE HUMAN
IMPACT 1 (2012), http://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/08/the-human-impact-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/GQ93-VRTB]; JENNIFER FRATELLO, ANDRES F. RENGIFO, JENNIFER
TRONE & BRENDA VELAZQUEZ, VERA INST. OF JUST., COMING OF AGE WITH STOP AND FRISK:
EXPERIENCES, PERCEPTIONS, AND PUBLIC SAFETY IMPLICATIONS iii, 34 fig.14 (2013), http://ww
w.vera.org/downloads/Publications/coming-of-age-with-stop-and-frisk-experiences-self-perc
eptions-and-public-safety-implications/legacy_downloads/stop-and-frisk-technical-report-v4
.pdf [https://perma.cc/NMX8-5RUH].
15
See Yasmeen Khan, NYC Has “A Long Way to Go” to End the Illegal Stop-and-Frisk Era,
GOTHAMIST (Feb. 25, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://gothamist.com/news/nyc-ending-illegal-stop-a
nd-frisk-era [https://perma.cc/38N7-D3CG] (reporting that, in 2019, “88% of people stopped
were Black or Latino,” representing a 3% increase from the time the Floyd decision declared
SQF unconstitutional in 2013).
16
Stop-and-Frisk Data: Annual Stop-and-Frisk Numbers, NYCLU [hereinafter NYCLU,
SQF Data], https://www.nyclu.org/en/Stop-and-Frisk-data [https://perma.cc/JR5J-MFTA];
cf. NYCLU, STOP-AND-FRISK IN THE DE BLASIO ERA 1–2 (2019), [hereinafter NYCLU, DE
BLASIO ERA] https://www.nyclu.org/sites/default/files/field_documents/20190314_nyclu_sto
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examining the specific factors surrounding those stops. By statistically controlling for a number of situational factors, this study provides insights into whether
race, ethnicity, and sex affect the chances of being frisked, searched, and subjected to force during an SQF encounter in New York City.
This Article is organized in six parts. Part I will trace the origin of stop-andfrisk authority from its common law roots to the present. Part II will summarize
the undercurrent of racial injustice in stop-and-frisk practices. Part III will examine how those issues were particularly problematic in New York City during
the height of its aggressive SQF crime-control strategy, including summarizing
some of the consequences of SQF. Part IV will present the research questions of
the present study and the methodology we use to investigate those questions. Part
V will present the results of our statistical analyses. And Part VI will discuss our
findings and the conclusions we draw from them.
I.

STOP-AND-FRISK AUTHORITY17

Stop-and-frisk as a tactic dates back to English common law.18 During that
time, English constables and “watchmen,” as well as private citizens, were
granted the authority to stop people they deemed as suspicious at night.19 During
the stops, suspicious persons could be legally questioned and even detained “until the morning, and if no suspicion, they are then to be [released], and if suspicion be touching them, they shall be delivered to the sheriff.”20
This same authority was adopted in the United States, particularly with the
development of professional police departments. Many local and state courts upheld the constitutionality of stop-and-frisk authority over the years, but often
there were substantial differences in application, which created variation among
the states in how police utilized the tactic.21 These differences eventually
prompted the U.S. Supreme Court to weigh in on the matter in a triumvirate of
cases in 1968 that set federal constitutional benchmarks for stop-and-frisk within
the framework of the Fourth Amendment: Terry v. Ohio22 and the companion
pfrisk_singles.pdf [https://perma.cc/W25M-QSA2] (analyzing NYPD SQF activities between
2014 and 2017 and reporting that Black and Hispanic males between the ages of fourteen and
twenty-four accounted for 38% of reported stops even though they comprised only 5% of the
city’s population).
17
Portions of Part I are adapted from WHITE & FRADELLA, supra note 1, at 43–79, and Michael D. White, Henry F. Fradella, Weston J. Morrow & Douglas Mellom, Federal Civil Litigation as an Instrument of Police Reform: A Natural Experiment Exploring the Effects of the
Floyd Ruling on Stop-and-Frisk Activities in New York City, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 9, 15–22
(2016).
18
John A. Ronayne, The Right to Investigate and New York’s “Stop-and-Frisk” Law, 33
FORDHAM L. REV. 211, 214 (1964).
19
1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 229 (8th ed. 1824).
20
2 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 96 (Robert H. Small ed.,
1847); see also Lawrence v. Hedger [1810] 3 Taunt. 14, 128 Eng. Rep. 6 (C.P.).
21
Sam B. Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REV. 315, 318–24 (1942).
22
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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cases of Sibron v. New York and Peters v. New York.23 Collectively, these rulings
afforded police the discretion to stop citizens based on reasonable suspicion. This
standard of proof required more than a mere hunch but less evidence than probable cause; it is satisfied when a law enforcement officer can “point to specific
and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those
facts, reasonably warrant” a brief, limited stop to investigate whether criminal
activity is afoot.24 These cases also made clear that law enforcement officers may
superficially “pat down” a suspect if there is reasonable suspicion to believe the
suspect is armed.25 Such frisks are limited to cursory inspections for weapons
and, therefore, may not involve a “general exploratory search for whatever evidence of criminal activity he might find.”26
Justice William Douglas wrote the lone dissenting opinion in Terry. He rejected the notion that the Reasonableness Clause of the Fourth Amendment could
provide a basis to support stop-and-frisk outside the usual probable cause standard.27 Indeed, Douglas presciently cautioned that the reasonable suspicion standard—one so low that it would not justify a magistrate issuing a warrant—would
not ring a “bell of certainty.”28 Rather, such a low and amorphous standard would
be a blank check for law enforcement officers to exercise nearly unbridled discretion without regard to constitutional protections.29
Perhaps as reaction to the concerns Douglas raised in his dissent in Terry,
Chief Justice Earl Warren’s majority opinion in the case was written very cautiously and narrowly.30 The opinion could have been applied in a manner limited
to police safety stops. But through subsequent cases—most notably Adams v.
Williams31 and Delaware v. Prouse32—Terry gradually was interpreted as granting police expansive “stop” authority to conduct broader, more general investigative detentions than their English common-law counterparts, which were

23

Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 43–44 (1968).
Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
25
Id. at 8.
26
Id. at 30. For an interesting discussion of how expanding Second Amendment rights pose
challenges for frisks, see Shawn E. Fields, Stop and Frisk in a Concealed Carry World, 93
WASH. L. REV. 1675, 1694–95 (2018).
27
Terry, 392 U.S. at 35–39 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
28
Id. at 37.
29
Id. at 38–39.
30
Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara
and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 395, 401, 404, 423 (1988).
31
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S 143, 147 (1972) (upholding a vehicle stop and a “frisk” of a
car for a handgun that was found exactly where an informant had told the officer it would be
found).
32
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 650–52 (1979) (declaring unconstitutional random spot
checks of cars made without a pre-established protocol, but in doing so, paving the way for
Terry’s stop authority upon reasonable suspicion to justify systematic roadblocks that foster
traffic safety); see also, e.g., Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 454–55 (1990).
24
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confined to night-time detentions to prevent breaches of the peace.33 Moreover,
those who made arrests under English common-law authority were subject to
liability for false imprisonment if the overnight detention was not justified.34 As
Rosenthal noted, “[u]nder the contemporary qualified immunity doctrine, in contrast, officers face no personal liability even if they violate Fourth Amendment
standards, as long as their judgment under the circumstances is considered reasonable.”35 Courts assess the validity of stop-and-frisks under the reasonable suspicion standard by considering “the whole picture”—all of the facts known under
the “totality of the circumstances.”36 Importantly, judges are supposed to defer
to the professional judgment and experience of police when assessing the totality
of the circumstances.37
Throughout the 1980s, the Court exempted several classes of stops from the
usual requirements of Terry.38 For example, in United States v. Mendenhall, the
Court ruled that a stop had not occurred when federal agents approached the defendant in the open concourse area of an airport.39 Because the agents neither
wore uniforms nor displayed weapons and because they requested—but did not
demand—to see the defendant’s ticket and identification, the Court reasoned that
the encounter did not constitute a stop that qualified as a seizure for Fourth
Amendment purposes.40 Rather, the stop was deemed a voluntary and cooperative encounter because at no time should a reasonable person in the defendant’s

33
Ronayne, supra note 18, at 213–15. Frank Rudy Cooper notes that the expansion of Terry
beyond its original confines is attributable, in part, to the law-and-order “backlash against the
1960s civil right movements” and its attendant calls for “heightened crime control” in the
1970s and 1980s. Cooper, supra note 7, at 9–10.
34
Lawrence Rosenthal, Pragmatism, Originalism, Race, and the Case against Terry v. Ohio,
43 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 299, 332–33 (2010).
35
Id. at 333.
36
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981).
37
Id. at 421–22 (emphasizing that the relevant line of inquiry in the case was “whether, based
upon the whole picture, they, as experienced Border Patrol officers, could reasonably surmise
that the particular vehicle they stopped was engaged in criminal activity”). For an analysis of
how deference to police experience factors into the reasonable suspicion standard, see David
A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means Stopped and
Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 666 (1994).
38
At first blush, the cases discussed in the remainder of Part I may appear to lack a common
thread other than expanding stop-and-frisk authority. But there is a theoretical connection between Terry and these cases if Terry is viewed as having accomplished more than authorizing
stop-and-frisk under the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, Terry severed the Reasonableness
Clause from the Warrant Clause, thereby carving out swathes of police conduct exempt from
both the requirements of probable cause and a warrant. See, e.g., Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Terry v.
Ohio, The Warren Court and the Fourth Amendment: A Law Clerk’s Perspective, 72 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 891, 894–95, 898 (1998); Luis G. Stelzner, The Fourth Amendment: The Reasonableness and Warrant Clauses, 10 N.M. L. REV. 33, 44–46 (1979–80). Thus, all of the
cases highlighted in the remainder of Part I were decided with regard to a balancing test aimed
at “reasonableness” divorced from other Fourth Amendment principles.
39
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 555 (1980).
40
Id.
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situation have ever felt that she could not leave.41 Then, in I.N.S. v. Delgado, the
“free to leave” test morphed into something even more restrictive on personal
liberty. Specifically, the Court reasoned that because workers were free to continue working and moving about a factory while armed agents wearing badges
roamed the premises questioning people about their immigration status, the
workers were not seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.42 The
Court further narrowed Terry in Florida v. Bostick when it clarified that law enforcement officers have the authority to stop and ask basic investigatory questions—including requests to examine identification or to search the luggage of
bus passengers—without there being a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes
“as long as the police do not convey a message that compliance with their requests is required.”43 In short, Bostick interpreted Mendenhall’s free to leave test
by narrowing the inquiry regarding coercive demonstrations of police authority;
specifically, the Bostick interpretation views police action from the perspective
of a “reasonable, innocent person.”44
In other cases, the Supreme Court extended the authority of police to conduct
frisks. Consider that in Michigan v. Long, the Court permitted the police to conduct a brief search of the passenger compartment of a car to look for hidden
weapons.45
Perhaps most importantly, the Court has partially retreated from the notion
that reasonable suspicion needs to be based on more than just hunches. In Alabama v. White, the Court upheld a stop of a vehicle based on an anonymous tip,
even though there was no indication of the reliability of the tip.46 That decision
paved the way for Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, which authorized
sobriety checkpoints at which police stopped drivers without any particularized
suspicion of driving while impaired.47 In Illinois v. Wardlow, the Court approved
of officers making an inference of suspicion after a suspect fled48—an inference
that logically extends to any type of evasive behavior.49 Whren v. United States

41

Id.
I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217–18 (1984).
43
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434–35 (1991).
44
Id. at 437–38.
45
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1035 (1983).
46
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990).
47
Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990). In City of Indianapolis v.
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000), the Court curtailed law enforcement authority to use drug-sniffing dogs at roadblocks on the grounds that the DUI checkpoints sanctioned in Sitz were “designed to serve special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,” id. at 37 (internal
quotations omitted); whereas suspicionless searches using drug-sniffing dogs at roadblocks
impermissibly extended into the realm of investigating “ordinary criminal wrongdoing.” Id.
at 38. Nonetheless, Sitz remains good law insofar as it permits stops of vehicles at DUI checkpoints without any particularized suspicion of impaired driving.
48
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000).
49
Hundreds of cases have relied on evasion in a high-crime area to justify Terry stops. See
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Damien Bernache, The “High-Crime Area” Question: Requiring
42
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upheld pretextual stops, thereby allowing police to conduct stops for minor infractions so they could investigate other, more serious crimes.50 And because
Minnesota v. Dickerson approved of the so-called “plain feel” exception,51 police
likely have an incentive to frisk people even when they do not actually fear the
presence of a weapon,52 but rather hope to feel some drugs in the pat-down—a
seemingly permissible pretext in light of Whren.53 Notably, Justice Antonin
Scalia wrote a concurring opinion in Dickerson in which he expressed doubts
about the constitutionality of Terry as applied to “frisks” because it exceeded the
scope of authority granted to watchmen under English night-walker statutes.54
Scalia expressed doubt that “the fiercely proud men who adopted our Fourth
Amendment would have allowed themselves to be subjected, on mere suspicion
of being armed and dangerous, to such indignity.”55 In other words, where we
are today with stop-and-frisk authority under Terry is not necessarily a preordained constitutional conclusion.
In short, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has steadily expanded the authority to conduct stop-and-frisks since the early 1980s. Notably, this expanded authority increased the risk that officers would employ racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic class stereotypes as part of a calculus of suspicion to initiate stop-andfrisks.56 The expansion of this authority, and the increased risk of racial profiling,
is especially problematic when considering the persistent undercurrent of racial
injustice throughout nearly two centuries of American policing—an undercurrent that is even evident in the Terry decision itself.57
Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence for Fourth Amendment Reasonable Suspicion Analysis,
57 AM. U. L. REV. 1587, 1590 n.10 (2008).
50
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 811–12 (1996).
51
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 371 (1993).
52
To be clear, we are not suggesting that Whren led to Dickerson. In Sibron, the Court held
that the test is whether a reasonable person would find a frisk to be justified under the circumstances, regardless of whether the particular officer conducting the frisk subjectively believed
it was justified. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64 (1968). Whren passed up the opportunity
to alter Sibron by applying the “reasonableness” analysis to pretextual stops where an officer
stops someone in a situation in which no other officer would do so. Whren, 517 U.S. at 809.
Because Whren failed to find such action unreasonable, our point is that the combination of
Dickerson and Whren—the combination of “plain feel” without the ability to challenge a frisk
as being pretextual—created an incentive for law enforcement officers to conduct frisks even
when they do not suspect the presence of a weapon.
53
Janet Koven Levit called such pretexts “the Death of Terry v. Ohio.” Janet Koven Levit,
Pretextual Traffic Stops: United States v. Whren and the Death of Terry v. Ohio, 28 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 145, 145 (1996); see also Gabriel J. Chin & Charles J. Vernon, Reasonable but Unconstitutional: Racial Profiling and the Radical Objectivity of Whren v. United States, 83
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 882, 893–94 (2015).
54
Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 380–81 (Scalia, J., concurring).
55
Id. at 381 (Scalia, J., concurring).
56
See Cooper, supra note 7, at 55–56 (arguing that Terry evolved into “little more than a
speed bump for aggressive police departments” especially in high-crime areas where the prevalence of crime became “the principal rationale for blanketing [B]lack and Latinx communities with stops and frisks”).
57
Id. at 55 (noting the racial issues in Terry that were not acknowledged in the decision).
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II. STOP-AND-FRISK AND THE UNDERCURRENT OF RACIAL INJUSTICE58
An undercurrent of racial injustice and discrimination has served as a backdrop in professional policing in the United States for the last 175 years.59 The
larger race relation problems that have defined American policing provide an
important lens through which to view the rulings in Terry and subsequent cases,
as well as the increasing reliance on mass stop-and-frisk programs in New York
and elsewhere.
A. Racial Issues in Terry v. Ohio
In his opinion in Terry, Chief Justice Warren noted that stop-and-frisk activities by police contributed to racial strife:
We would be less than candid if we did not acknowledge that this question thrusts
to the fore difficult and troublesome issues regarding a sensitive area of police
activity—issues which have never before been squarely presented to this Court.
Reflective of the tensions involved are the practical and constitutional arguments
pressed with great vigor on both sides of the public debate over the power of the
police to “stop and frisk”—as it is sometimes euphemistically termed—suspicious
persons.60

The opinions in Terry, however, omitted or glossed over several important
facts relevant to the racial issues underlying the case. Indeed, nowhere in any of
the opinions in Terry does any justice mention that both Terry and his co-defendant, Chilton, were Black men.61 Nor does any justice mention that a third man,
Katz—a White man whom a police officer observed interacting with Terry and
Chilton—was not charged; he was held as a “suspicious person” and released
after two days.62 According to the transcript of the trial court’s suppression hearing in Terry, the officer testified that when he saw the men standing on the street,
“they didn’t look right to [him] at the time.”63 Criminologists Delores JonesBrown and Brian Maule suggested that his attention may have been drawn to the

The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People [NAACP] believed that the
Terry case had so much racial significance that it wanted to participate in the oral argument. The
Supreme Court denied this request, and the racial consequences of its decision were not dwelt
upon. The fact that Mr. Terry was African-American is never mentioned in the opinion.

Paul Butler, Stop and Frisk and Torture-Lite: Police Terror of Minority Communities, 12 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 57, 59 (2014).
58
Portions of Part II are adapted from WHITE & FRADELLA, supra note 1, at 147–86, and from
White et al., supra note 17, at 22–29.
59
WHITE & FRADELLA, supra note 1, at 9–12, 159–61.
60
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1968).
61
Id. at 4–6; see also John Q. Barrett, Deciding the Stop and Frisk Cases: A Look Inside the
Supreme Court’s Conference, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 749 app. B at 1389 (1998).
62
Terry, 392 U.S. at 7; see also Transcript of Trial, State v. Chilton, No. 79432 (Cuyahoga
Ct. C.P. Sept. 29, 1964), reprinted in Barrett, supra note 61 app. B at 1464–65.
63
Barrett, supra note 62, at 1456.

21 NEV. L.J. 1151

Spring 2021]

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF STOP AND FRISK

1161

men on account of their race.64 This conclusion is bolstered by a number of ambiguities and inconsistencies in the officer’s account of the case. He could not
explain why he was initially suspicious of the men; he repeatedly changed the
number of trips the men made up and down the street, and he expressed uncertainty regarding the type of store into which the men were looking.65 Thus, the
reasonableness of the initial stop appears to be more open to debate than the
Terry decision suggests. The failure of the Court to address the questionable reasonableness of the stop in Terry illustrates how the very foundation of the reasonable-suspicion standard in American constitutional law masks racially disparate stop-and-frisk practices with the cloak of race neutrality.66
B. Racial Issues Throughout American Policing
Police scholars George Kelling and Mark Moore developed a widely cited
historical framework that contextualizes 150 years of police history into three
eras: political, reform, and community problem-solving.67 Though the Kelling
and Moore framework is useful for examining police history, it has been criticized for overlooking the role of racism in professional policing. Hubert Williams and Patrick Murphy, for example, argue that the origins of U.S. policing
are rooted in slave patrols in the South and that the advances that have occurred
through the “reform” and “community problem-solving” eras excluded minority
citizens.68 In effect, as policing progressed through the political, professional,
and community problem-solving eras, the minority community was left behind.
Williams and Murphy referred to this as the “minority view” of policing.69
The disconnects between police and people of racial and ethnic minority
backgrounds have a palpable impact on police-citizen encounters. In other
words, the minority view of policing shapes how people behave. But citizens’
perceptions of police are also shaped by local social contexts, especially in
64
Delores Jones-Brown & Brian A. Maule, Racially Biased Policing: A Review of the Judicial
and Legislative Literature, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND POLICING: NEW AND ESSENTIAL
READINGS 140, 145 (Stephen K. Rice & Michael D. White eds., 2010).
65
Lewis R. Katz, Terry v. Ohio at Thirty-Five: A Revisionist View, 74 MISS. L.J. 423, 430–
32 (2004).
66
See Thomas B. McAffee, Setting Us Up for Disaster: The Supreme Court’s Decision in
Terry v. Ohio, 12 NEV. L.J. 609, 612–13 (2012); Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio’s Fourth
Amendment Legacy: Black Men and Police Discretion, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1271, 1278–79
(1998). For an in-depth discussion of how racial stereotypes contribute to police officer suspicion in the SQF context, see Henry F. Fradella, Weston J. Morrow & Michael D. White,
Terry and SQF Viewed Through the Lens of the Suspicion Heuristic, 52 CRIM. L. BULL. 871
(2016).
67
GEORGE L. KELLING & MARK H. MOORE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., PERSPECTIVES ON POLICING
NO. 4, THE EVOLVING STRATEGY OF POLICING 1, 2 (1988), http://www.innovations.harvard.ed
u/sites/default/files/114213.pdf [https://perma.cc/EY8W-G6VF].
68
HUBERT WILLIAMS & PATRICK V. MURPHY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., PERSPECTIVES ON
POLICING NO. 13, THE EVOLVING STRATEGY OF POLICE: A MINORITY VIEW 1, 1–2 (1990), http:/
/www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/121019.pdf [https://perma.cc/5MKE-N6AA].
69
Id. at 1.
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neighborhoods that are characterized by concentrated disadvantage—a sociological concept that encompasses high rates of unemployment, poverty, and female-headed households; high percentage of the local population being under
the age of eighteen; and high rates of people receiving public assistance.70 People
living in such areas experience poor outcomes on a range of life dimensions,
including poor birth outcomes; decreased mental health; lack of access to healthy
foods and recreational areas; decreased cognitive abilities; and high rates of child
maltreatment, teen pregnancy, school dropout, risk-taking behaviors, and violent
crime.71 Collectively, the concentrated disadvantages common in these communities often impact residents’ willingness to cooperate with the police:
There are many potential reasons for this relationship—people in poor communities may lack bonds with officers and fear retaliation from helping the police, to
name a few. Neighborhood social context also influences police officer behavior.
For example, officers are more likely to stop, search, arrest, use coercive force,
and engage in misconduct in high-crime neighborhoods marked by concentrated
disadvantage. Therefore, it is safe to say that neighborhoods matter to policingrelated outcomes.72

Kelling and Moore published their framework in the late 1980s, but the experiences of numerous agencies with stop-and-frisk suggest that Williams and
Murphy’s “minority view” of policing is still a stark reality. The Philadelphia
Police Department (PPD) stopped more than 250,000 citizens in 2009, prompting the American Civil Liberties Union of Pennsylvania (ACLU-PA) to file a
federal lawsuit in November 2010.73 The lawsuit, Bailey v. City of Philadelphia,
alleged that the PPD was engaged in racial profiling.74 The litigation resulted in
a settlement agreement between the plaintiffs and the PPD that centered on quarterly analysis of stop data by the ACLU-PA, appointment of an independent
monitor, retraining of officers, and new protocols governing stop-and-frisk practices.75 The ACLU-PA subsequently reported to the court and the settlement
monitor that although the number of stops had declined by 15%,76 there had been
70
See, e.g., ASS’N OF MATERNAL & CHILD HEALTH PROGRAMS, LIFE COURSE INDICATOR:
CONCENTRATED DISADVANTAGE 1 (2013), http://www.amchp.org/programsandtopics/data-assessment/LifeCourseIndicatorDocuments/LC-06_ConcentratedDisad_Final-4-24-2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J87X-HCZR].
71
Id. at 2.
72
John A. Shjarback, Justin Nix & Scott E Wolfe, The Ecological Structuring of Police Officers’ Perceptions of Citizen Cooperation, 64 CRIME & DELINQ. 1143, 1144 (2018) (internal
citations omitted).
73
Complaint at 21, Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, No. 2:10-cv-05952-RBS, 2010 WL
4662865 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2010).
74
Id. at 2.
75
Settlement Agreement, Class Certification & Consent Decree at 3–5, Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, No. 10-5952 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 2011), http://www.aclupa.org/sites/default/files/fiel
d_documents/bailey_consent_decree_6-21-11_.pdf [https://perma.cc/EX2Z-8NXE].
76
Plaintiffs’ Third Report to Court and Monitor on Stop and Frisk Practices at 4, Bailey v.
City of Philadelphia, No. 10-5952 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 2013), http://www.clearinghouse.net/ch
Docs/public/PN-PA-0013-0003.pdf [https://perma.cc/YFW5-SGEX].
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no significant improvement in the quality of stops and frisks. By our analysis,
pedestrian stops are being made without reasonable suspicion in approximately
43–47% of the cases . . . . Frisks are being conducted without reasonable suspicion in over 45% of the cases . . . . By race, 76% of the stops were of minorities
(African-Americans and Latinos) and 85% of the frisks were of minorities. The
findings as to impermissible stops and frisks are particularly disturbing given the
fact that the Police Department had the time and resources following the entry of
the Agreement to re-train its officers on stop and frisk practices and to establish
supervisory reviews to ensure accountability for practices that failed to meet clear
mandates under the Agreement.77

The reports from the ACLU-PA continue to raise questions about the PPD’s
use of Terry stops. Their 2015 report found that 37% of stops lacked reasonable
suspicion; contraband was only found in 2% of stops and 5% of frisks; and
Blacks comprised approximately 72% and 79% of all stops and frisks, respectively, while they made up only 43% of Philadelphia’s population.78 And their
most recent report (as of the writing of this Article) shows that, although the PPD
has made substantial progress in aligning its stop-and-frisk practices with constitutional requirements, there are still numerous concerns. The analysis shows
that 16% percent of all stops and 38% of all frisks were made without reasonable
suspicion.79 Importantly, the “hit rate” for stop-and-frisks continued to be quite
low: less than 1% yielded firearms and less than 4% yielded other contraband,
such as drugs.80 Moreover, the data suggest that stop-and-frisk activity by PPD
continues to disproportionately affect Black Philadelphians:
[T]he share of stops without reasonable suspicion is 11% for Whites, 13% for
Latinos and 18% for Blacks. . . . The share of frisks made without reasonable suspicion is . . . highest for minorities, making up 39% of frisks of Blacks and 31%
of Latino frisks, whereas the rate for Whites is still quite high at 28%. . . . This
means Blacks are over 50% more likely to be stopped without reasonable suspicion than Whites . . . [and] Blacks are 40% more likely to be frisked without reasonable suspicion than Whites.81

In 2013, the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (ACLU-NJ)
evaluated six months of stop-and-frisk practices in Newark.82 According to the
ACLU-NJ, the Newark Police Department conducted an average of 2,093 stops
77

Id. at 4–5 (footnote omitted).
Plaintiffs’ Fifth Report to Court and Monitor on Stop and Frisk Practices at 12–19, Bailey
v. City of Philadelphia, No. 10-5952 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2015), http://www.aclupa.org/sites/default/files/field_documents/bailey_fifth_report_2-24-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/BR7L-ZVD7].
79
Plaintiffs’ Tenth Report to Court on Stop and Frisk Practices: Fourth Amendment Issues at
20, Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, No. 10-5952 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 20, 2020), https://aclupa.org
/sites/default/files/field_documents/104_plaintiffs_tenth_report_on_4th_amendment_issues
.pdf [https://perma.cc/9JDH-SP5P].
80
Id. at 21.
81
Id. at 10–11.
82
UDI OFER & ARI ROSMARIN, ACLU OF N.J., STOP-AND-FRISK: A FIRST LOOK 4 (2014),
https://www.aclu-nj.org/files/8113/9333/6064/2014_02_25_nwksnf.pdf [https://perma.cc/4B
K3-J8CT].
78
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per month from July to December 2013.83 The authors note that this translates to
a rate of 91 stops per 1,000 residents, a stop rate that was eleven times greater
than the NYPD stop rate during the same time period.84 The ACLU-NJ report
also discovered racial disproportionality in stops, as Blacks represented 52% of
the area’s population but 75% of those who were stopped by Newark police.85 It
is not possible to evaluate whether anything has changed in the past few years
because the Newark Police Department has not released stop-and-frisk data since
2014.86 And Newark is not alone in its lack of transparency. An investigation
into Terry stops by the Miami Gardens Police Department found that, from 2008
to 2013, officers had stopped 65,328 individuals—“more than half of the city’s
population,” including children in playgrounds and senior citizens near their retirement homes.87 Police stopped 250 of these people more than 20 times.88 We
have not been able to locate any data to update these figures in the years since
then.
In 2015, the American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois (ACLU-IL) published a report claiming that the Chicago Police Department (CPD) had “failed
to train, supervise and monitor law enforcement in minority communities for
decades, resulting in a failure to ensure that officers’ use of stop and frisk is
lawful.”89 These stop-and-frisk stories are consistent with Williams and Murphy’s “minority view” and demonstrate the perpetuation of the undercurrent of
racial injustice in American policing.90 Notably, the total number of stops in Chicago decreased approximately 80% after the CPD entered into a settlement
agreement with the ACLU-IL, but there have been no corresponding improvements in addressing racial disparities in stop-and-frisks in the city.91 Specifically,

83

Id. at 6.
Id. at 7.
85
Id. at 8.
86
Newark Stop-and-Frisk, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION OF N.J., https://www.aclu-nj.org/theissues/policepractices/newark-stop-and-frisk-data [https://perma.cc/87SU-EANF].
87
WHITE & FRADELLA, supra note 1, at 6; Alice Brennan & Dan Lieberman, Florida City’s
‘Stop and Frisk’ Nabs Thousands of Kids, Finds 5-year-olds ‘Suspicious,’ FUSION (May 9,
2014, 11:23 AM), http://fusion.tv/story/5568/florida-citys-stop-frisk-nabs-thousands-of-kidsfinds-5-year-olds-suspicious/ [https://perma.cc/BN8U-SRN6]. Reporters found evidence of
children as young as five years of age being stopped and 982 stops of people aged seventy and
above. Conor Friedersdorf, The City Where Blacks Suffer Under ‘Stop and Frisk on Steroids’,
ATLANTIC (May 30, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/05/where-blac
ks-suffer-under-stop-and-frisk-on-steroids/371869/ [https://perma.cc/UKP3-TREZ].
88
Brennan & Lieberman, supra note 87; Friedersdorf, supra note 87.
89
ACLU OF ILL., STOP AND FRISK IN CHICAGO 2 (2015), http://www.aclu-il.org/sites/default/files/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/ACLU_StopandFrisk_6.pdf [https://perma.cc/UK76CDEQ].
90
See WILLIAMS & MURPHY, supra note 68, at 1.
91
ARLANDER KEYS, THE THIRD REPORT ASSESSING THE CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT’S
COMPLIANCE WITH THE INVESTIGATORY & PROTECTIVE PAT DOWN AGREEMENT 19 (2019),
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6523407-ACLU-Report-10-17-19.html#docume
nt/p19/a532447 [https://perma.cc/TS39-QV92]
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71.8% of all stops in 2016 and 2017 involved Blacks, 20% involved Hispanics,
and 8.1% involved Whites.92
These data snapshots demonstrate that many U.S. cities continue to struggle
with racial and ethnic tensions in police-citizen relationships. But the unique way
in which stop-and-frisk was implemented in New York City contributed to that
particular city having one of the most vexing and persistent problems with policing communities of color.
III. STOP-AND-FRISK AND THE NYPD
The NYPD story demonstrates how the use of stop-and-frisk as a widespread
crime-control strategy can go terribly wrong. The story represents a collision
between a constitutionally permissible tactic used in an unconstitutional manner
and the persistent undercurrent of racial injustice in policing. The next section
describes how this collision developed.
A. Crime, Disorder, and Broken Windows
New York City, like many cities across the United States, experienced a major spike in violence, crime, and disorder in the 1980s.93 Much of the violence in
New York was driven by the emergence of crack cocaine and competition for
the drug market.94 Homicides climbed steadily from 1,392 in 1985 to 2,262 in
1990.95 At the same time, the subway system and the city itself were struggling
with rampant social and physical disorder.96 Marijuana, heroin, cocaine, and
crack cocaine were regularly and openly being sold on street corners and blocks
and in city parks.97 Kelling and Coles estimated that “[a]pproximately 1,200 to
2,000 persons a night” were sleeping in the subway system.98
The New York Transit Authority appointed William Bratton as chief of the
transit police to address crime and disorder in the subway system.99 Chief Bratton
partnered with criminologist George Kelling to develop an enforcement strategy

92

Id.
For a full discussion on the NYPD prior to 1994, see generally JAMES LARDNER & THOMAS
REPPETTO, NYPD: A CITY AND ITS POLICE (2000).
94
See generally Roland G. Fryer, Jr., Paul S. Heaton, Steven D. Levitt & Kevin M. Murphy,
Measuring Crack Cocaine and Its Impact, 51 ECON. INQUIRY 1651 (2013).
95
Michael D. White, The New York City Police Department, Its Crime Control Strategies and
Organizational Changes, 1970-2009, 31 JUST. Q. 74, 79 (2014).
96
GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS: RESTORING
ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES 117–18 (1996).
97
Bruce D. Johnson, Andrew Golub & James E. McCabe, The International Implications of
Quality-of-Life Policing as Practiced in New York City, 11 POLICE PRAC. & RES. 17, 18 (2010).
98
KELLING & COLES, supra note 96, at 117.
99
The Life and Times of Incoming NYPD Commissioner William Bratton, N.Y. DAILY NEWS
(Dec. 5, 2013, 2:06 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/timeline-new-nypd-com
missioner-bratton-article-1.1538689 [https://perma.cc/CV6Z-UUHN].
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based on Wilson and Kelling’s Broken Windows Theory100 that targeted lowlevel offenses (e.g., turnstile jumping), as well as social and physical disorder
through frequent arrests and removals from the subway system.101 Broken Windows Theory posits that minor forms of social and physical disorder cause a
breakdown in informal social control as citizen investment in an area diminishes.102 As citizens withdraw from the area, the level of disorder increases, and
the risk for more serious types of crime to emerge becomes greater.103 The theory
suggests that police focus enforcement efforts on disorder and quality-of-life offenses as a mechanism for reengaging law-abiding citizens’ commitment to the
area.104 Under Chief Bratton, the transit police adopted a broken-windows-based
strategy in the subway system.105 Over the next two years, the level of disorder
dropped dramatically, and felony offenses declined by 30%.106
In 1993, New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani appointed William Bratton as the Commissioner of the NYPD, and Bratton immediately began implementation of a broken-windows-based strategy throughout New York.107 Two
policy initiatives defined the NYPD crime-control strategy. First, Reclaiming the
Public Spaces of New York outlined the Broken Windows Theory and articulated
an order-maintenance strategy that targeted disorder and quality-of-life offenses
through systematic and aggressive enforcement strategies (e.g., replicating the
subway strategy).108 Second, Getting Guns off the Streets of New York109 outlined
the NYPD’s strategy to reduce gun violence through the seizure of illegal

100

See George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC (Mar. 1982), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/
broken-windows/304465/ [https://perma.cc/PWS5-QM2S].
101
See Ana Joanes, Does the New York City Police Department Deserve Credit for the Decline in New York City’s Homicide Rates? A Cross-City Comparison of Policing Strategies
and Homicide Rates, 33 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 265, 265 (2000) (citing Jackson Toby,
Reducing Crime: New York’s Example, WASH. POST, July 23, 1996, at A17).
102
Kelling & Wilson, supra note 100.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
See, e.g., Jeffrey Bellin, The Inverse Relationship Between the Constitutionality and Effectiveness of New York City “Stop and Frisk”, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1495, 1505 (2014) (positing
that that the Broken Windows theory “created the conditions under which [SQF] would eventually thrive”).
106
Joanes, supra note 101, at 265.
107
Alison Mitchell, Giuliani Appoints Bostonian to Run New York’s Police, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
3, 1993), http://www.nytimes.com/1993/12/03/nyregion/giuliani-appoints-bostonian-to-runnew-york-s-police.html [https://perma.cc/PFC2-NQCH].
108
N.Y. CITY POLICE DEP’T, POLICE STRATEGY NO. 5: RECLAIMING THE PUBLIC SPACES OF
NEW YORK 38–43 (1994), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Photocopy/167807NCJRS.pdf [htt
ps://perma.cc/2B8X-P3JZ].
109
See generally N.Y. CITY POLICE DEP’T, POLICE STRATEGY NO. 1: GETTING GUNS OFF THE
STREETS OF NEW YORK (1994), https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/abstract.aspx?ID=16
7805 [https://perma.cc/QT4X-2ZZ5].
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firearms and through the intensive investigation of gun-related incidents.110 Stopand-frisk emerged as the primary tactic to meet the objectives of both policy
initiatives.111
Over the next several years, critics argued that police over-enforced qualityof-life infractions through a zero-tolerance approach because officers could easily justify the stops under the reasonable suspicion standard.112 There is no doubt
that police used “quality-of-life offenses as excuses to fish for drugs, guns, or
evidence of more serious crime.”113 The effects of the stop-and-frisk program
were immediate. “From 1993 to 1996 arrests rose by 23%, including a 40% increase in misdemeanor arrests and a 97% increase in drug arrests.”114 The NYPD
made approximately 40,000 gun-related arrests over a three-year period, resulting in the removal of more than 50,000 guns from the streets.115 Stop-and-frisk
also produced a 500% increase in arrests for marijuana possession compared to
the previous decade.116
The NYPD’s use of stop-and-frisk increased steadily in the late 1990s and
into the twenty-first century. In 2003, for example, NYPD officers conducted
more than 160,000 stop-and-frisks of citizens.117 That same year, the NYPD implemented “Operation Impact,” a hot spots strategy where police commanders
identified twenty-four high-crime “Impact Zones” that would be targeted with
“saturation foot patrol in combination with resources from a variety of departmental divisions.”118 Stop-and-frisk activity increased dramatically over the next
several years, peaking at more than 685,000 in 2011.119 As the frequency of stops
increased, critics attacked the strategy’s low rates of return.120 Jones-Brown and
colleagues found that of the 540,320 stops in 2008, just 6% (32,206 stops) resulted in an arrest, and an additional 6.4% (34,802 stops) resulted in a summons;
110
See Dennis C. Smith & William J. Bratton, Performance Management in New York City:
Compstat and the Revolution in Police Management, in QUICKER, BETTER, CHEAPER:
MANAGING PERFORMANCE IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 453, 474 (Dall W. Forsythe ed., 2001).
111
White, supra note 95, at 84.
112
Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 475–76 (2000).
113
Sarah E. Waldeck, Cops, Community Policing, and the Social Norms Approach to Crime
Control: Should One Make Us More Comfortable with the Others?, 34 GA. L. REV. 1253,
1282 (2000).
114
White, supra note 95, at 82 (citing Judith A. Greene, Zero Tolerance. A Case Study of
Police Policies and Practices in New York City, 45 CRIME & DELINQ. 171 (1999)).
115
See Garen Wintemute, Guns and Gun Violence, in THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA 45, 71
(Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman eds., rev. ed. 2006).
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Geller & Fagan, supra note 12, at 592.
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NYCLU, SQF Data, supra note 16.
118
David Weisburd, Cody W. Telep & Brian A. Lawton, Could Innovations in Policing Have
Contributed to the New York City Crime Drop Even in a Period of Declining Police Strength?:
The Case of Stop, Question and Frisk as a Hot Spots Policing Strategy, 31 JUST. Q. 129, 136–
37 (2014).
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NYCLU, SQF Data, supra note 16.
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See, e.g., DELORES JONES-BROWN, JASPREET GILL & JENNIFER TRONE, STOP, QUESTION &
FRISK POLICING PRACTICES IN NEW YORK CITY: A PRIMER 10–11 (2010).
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thus, the percentage of “innocent stops”—those not resulting in summons or arrest—accounted for roughly 87.6% of total stops.121 Similarly, the percentage of
stops resulting in the recovery of a gun dropped by 60% from 0.39% (627 guns
recovered out of a total of 160,851 stops) in 2003 to 0.15% in 2008 (824 guns
recovered out of a total of 540,320 stops).122 Furthermore, the percentage of citizen complaints involving stops increased from 24.6% in 2004 to 32.7% in
2008.123
As the use of stop-and-frisk expanded dramatically, the NYPD drifted away
from the central tenets of Broken Windows Theory, and the program devolved
into a strictly zero-tolerance approach against social disorder such as public
drunkenness, vandalism, loitering, panhandling, prostitution, and the like.124 In
other words, rather than focusing on the “amelioration of physical disorder” in
partnership with the community, the NYPD focused on “interdiction of social
disorder.”125 These efforts led the NYPD to implement a set of practices that
encouraged the aggressive pursuit of individuals through stop-and-frisks, rather
than mutually beneficial interactions with law-abiding citizens.126 This zero-tolerance mentality compounded the police department’s disconnect from the community in a number of important ways. First, the NYPD focused less on preventing disorder and alternatives to arrest, and more on aggressively removing
weapons and wanted criminals from the community.127 Second, the NYPD deemphasized informal interactions between police and the community in the manner advocated by both community policing principles and Broken Windows Theory.128 The lack of police-community engagement was driven in large part by the
management style that Bratton embraced from the private sector.129 This management style stressed innovative approaches on management accountability,
prioritization, and data-driven decision-making.130 One of the primary structural
modifications to emerge from this management system was Compstat, a system
“defined by timely and accurate information, rapid deployment of resources, effective tactics, follow-up, and assessment.”131 Essentially, instead of identifying
community needs through engagement with residents, the NYPD determined
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Id. at 13 fig.8B.
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Id. at 14 fig.9.
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Waldeck, supra note 113, at 1273–74.
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Fagan & Davies, supra note 112, at 468.
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Waldeck, supra note 113, at 1274, 1282.
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Fagan & Davies, supra note 112, at 471–72.
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White, Fradella & Coldren, Jr., supra note 13.
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See, e.g., James J. Willis, Stephen D. Mastrofski & David Weisburd, Making Sense of
COMPSTAT: A Theory-Based Analysis of Organizational Change in Three Police Departments, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 147, 150–51 (2007) (explaining Bratton’s market-driven management style).
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Id. at 151.
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White, supra note 95, at 81.
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community needs through its own data-driven accountability system (i.e.,
Compstat).
B. Crime Control Benefits
During the same time that the NYPD implemented its order-maintenance
strategy to target disorder, illegal gun carrying, and crime (with stop-and-frisk
as a central feature), the city witnessed a large, prolonged drop in crime. From
the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, street crime in New York City declined approximately 75%—a decrease roughly twice the national average.132 In 2007, there
were 496 homicides in New York, down from more than 2,200 in 1990.133
Proponents of stop-and-frisk point to New York City’s crime decline over
the last two decades as evidence that the tactic is effective. For example, former
NYPD Commissioner Raymond Kelly touted stop-and-frisk at a news conference by saying:
Police stops are just one component of multiple efforts by the Department that
have saved lives and driven the murder rate to record lows. In the first 11 years
of Mayor Bloomberg’s tenure there were 7,363 fewer murders in New York City
compared to the 11 years prior to the Mayor taking office.134

Former New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg similarly praised the effectiveness of stop-and-frisk in combatting crime, stating: “New York is the safest
big city in the nation, and our crime reductions have been steeper than any other
big city’s. For instance, if New York City had the murder rate of Washington,
D.C., 761 more New Yorkers would have been killed last year.”135
Whether stop-and-frisk caused or contributed to the crime decline in New
York City is a hotly contested proposition.136 Several studies have suggested a
causal connection. Corman and Mocan reported that misdemeanor arrests were
associated with declines in robbery, motor vehicle theft, and grand larceny, but

132
See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CITY THAT BECAME SAFE: NEW YORK’S LESSONS FOR
URBAN CRIME AND ITS CONTROL X (2012).
133
See, e.g., Al Baker, New York on Track for Fewest Homicides on Record, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 28, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/29/nyregion/29murder.html?auth=logingoogle1tap&login=google1tap [https://perma.cc/CW4B-ZCCH].
134
New York Police Commissioner Ray Kelly Calls Stop-and-Frisk Decision ‘Disturbing and
Offensive’ (Transcript), N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.nydailynews.com/ne
ws/politics/new-york-police-commissioner-ray-kelly-comments-stop-and-frisk-decision-article-1.1424689 [https://perma.cc/J99Z-WH5W].
135
Michael R. Bloomberg, Michael Bloomberg: ‘Stop and Frisk’ Keeps New York Safe,
WASH. POST (Aug. 18, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/michael-bloomberg
-stop-and-frisk-keeps-new-york-safe/2013/08/18/8d4cd8c4-06cf-11e3-9259-e2aafe5a5f84_st
ory.html [https://perma.cc/5QVY-3FZ7].
136
For full treatment of this question, see generally Richard Rosenfeld, Karen Terry & Preet
Chauhan, New York’s Crime Drop Puzzle: Introduction to the Special Issue, 31 JUST. Q. 1
(2014) (special issue on the New York City crime decline).
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not homicide, assault, burglary, and rape.137 Similarly, Kelling and Sousa found
that misdemeanor arrest levels were significantly associated with reductions in
violent crime, while controlling for several relevant community factors.138 Smith
and Purtell found that Operation Impact had a significant effect on crimesagainst-persons in Impact Zones.139 Smith and Purtell also examined the effects
of stop-and-frisk on crime in New York, and they found that there was a significant inverse relationship between stop rates and robbery, burglary, motor vehicle theft, and homicides rates.140 Zimring argued that New York’s crime decline
from 1990 through 2009 was largely attributable to the NYPD’s policing practices.141
Conversely, there are a number of studies indicating that the relationship
between stop-and-frisk and the crime decline in New York City is modest at
best.142 For instance, Rosenfeld and Fornango found that police stops did not
decrease robbery and burglary rates.143 In a re-analysis of Kelling and Sousa’s
data, Harcourt and Ludwig found no significant relationships between policing
minor disorder offenses and New York City’s crime decline.144 MacDonald and

137

Hope Corman & Naci Mocan, Carrots, Sticks, and Broken Windows, 48 J.L. & ECON. 235,
255 tbl.3 (2005); see also ROBERT C. DAVIS & PEDRO MATEU-GELABERT, RESPECTFUL AND
EFFECTIVE POLICING: TWO EXAMPLES IN THE SOUTH BRONX 1 (1999).
138
GEORGE L. KELLING & WILLIAM H. SOUSA, JR., DO POLICE MATTER? AN ANALYSIS OF THE
IMPACT OF NEW YORK CITY’S POLICE REFORMS 7–9 (2001).
139
DENNIS C. SMITH & ROBERT PURTELL, AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF NYPD’S
“OPERATION IMPACT”: A TARGETED ZONE CRIME REDUCTION STRATEGY 9, 49 (2007).
140
See Report of Dennis C. Smith, Ph.D. at 25 n.32, Floyd v. City of New York, 813 F. Supp.
2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 08 Civ. 01034) (citing Dennis Charles Smith & Robert Purtell,
Does Stop-and-Frisk Stop Crime? (paper presented at the Annual Research Conference of the
Association of Public Policy and Management in Nov. 2008)); see also Dennis C. Smith, Stop
and Frisk Has Lowered Crime in Other Cities, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2012, 2:03 PM),
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/07/17/does-stop-and-frisk-reduce-crime/stopand-frisk-has-lowered-crime-in-other-cities [https://perma.cc/NL6Y-8XAA].
141
ZIMRING, supra note 132.
142
Magdalena Cerdá, Melissa Tracy, Steven F. Messner, David Vlahov, Kenneth J. Tardiff &
Sandro Galea, Misdemeanor Policing, Physical Disorder, and Gun-Related Homicide: A Spatial Analytic Test of “Broken-Windows” Theory, 20 EPIDEMIOLOGY 533, 540 (2009); Magdalena Cerdá, Steven F. Messner, Melissa Tracy, David Vlahov, Emily Goldmann, Kenneth J.
Tardiff & Sandro Galea, Investigating the Effect of Social Changes on Age-Specific Gun-Related Homicide Rates in New York City During the 1990s, 100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1107,
1111–12 (2010); Richard Rosenfeld, Robert Fornango & Andres F. Rengifo, The Impact of
Order-Maintenance Policing on New York City Homicide and Robbery Rates: 1988-2001, 45
CRIMINOLOGY 355, 375–77 (2007); cf. Alese Wooditch & David Weisburd, Using Space–
Time Analysis to Evaluate Criminal Justice Programs: An Application to Stop-Question-Frisk
Practices, 32 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 191, 205–07 (2016) (reporting that SQFs in the
Bronx had some “modest” deterrent effects, but any benefit did not extend beyond 300 feet of
the encounter or for more than a few days from the event).
143
Richard Rosenfeld & Robert Fornango, The Impact of Police Stops on Precinct Robbery
and Burglary Rates in New York City, 2003-2010, 31 JUST. Q. 96, 116 (2014).
144
Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence From New York
City and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 271, 276–77 (2006).
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colleagues conducted a comprehensive examination of the crime effects of Operation Impact (with a specific focus on stop-and-frisk). They concluded:
Impact zones were significantly associated with reductions in total reported
crimes, assaults, burglaries, drug violations, misdemeanor crimes, felony property
crimes, robberies, and felony violent crimes. Impact zones were significantly associated with increases in total reported arrests, arrests for burglary, arrests for
weapons, arrests for misdemeanor crimes, and arrests for property felony crimes.
Impact zones were also significantly associated with increases in investigative
stops for suspected crimes, but only the increase in stops made based on probable
cause indicators of criminal behaviors were associated with crime reductions. The
largest increase in investigative stops in impact zones was based on indicators of
suspicious behavior that had no measurable effect on crime. The findings suggest
that saturating high crime blocks with police helped reduce crime in New York
City, but that the bulk of the investigative stops did not play an important role in
the crime reductions. The findings indicate that crime reduction can be achieved
with more focused investigative stops.145

C. The Social Costs
Regardless of the impact on crime, there is considerable evidence demonstrating that the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk program exacted significant social costs
that were disproportionately experienced by racial and ethnic minorities.146 By
the end of the 1990s, stop-and-frisk had become a point of contention among
racial and ethnic minorities. A Vera Institute of Justice study examined the experiences of more than 500 people who had been stopped by the NYPD:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

44% of young people surveyed indicated they had been stopped repeatedly—
nine times or more.
Less than a third—29%—reported ever being informed of the reason for a stop.
71% of young people surveyed reported being frisked at least once, and 64%
said they had been searched.
45% reported encountering an officer who threatened them, and 46% said they
had experienced physical force at the hands of an officer.
One out of four said they were involved in a stop in which the officer displayed
his or her weapon.
61% stated that the way police acted towards them was influenced by their age.
51% indicated that they were treated worse than others because of their race
and/or ethnicity.147

145
John MacDonald, Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda Geller, The Effects of Local Police Surges on
Crime and Arrests in New York City, 11 PLOS ONE, June 16, 2016, at 1, https://journals.plos.
org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0157223 [https://perma.cc/VE39-PTS8].
146
For a comprehensive discussion of the many dimensions of such harms, see Susan A.
Bandes, Marie Pryor, Erin M. Kerrison & Phillip Atiba Goff, The Mismeasure of Terry Stops:
Assessing the Psychological and Emotional Harms of Stop and Frisk to Individuals and Communities, 37 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 176 (2019).
147
FRATELLO, RENGIFO, TRONE & VELAZQUEZ, supra note 14, at iii, 25–26, 34 fig.14, 89.
Butler argued that the psychological effects of such sustained surveillance and harassment
amounts to “torture lite.” Butler, supra note 57, at 61–66.
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A study by Fagan and colleagues on stop-and-frisk in New York City identified three noteworthy findings:
First, stops within neighborhoods take place at rates in excess of what would be
predicted from the separate and combined effects of population demography,
physical and social conditions, and the crime rate. This excess seems to be concentrated in predominately Black neighborhoods. Second, the excess stops in
these neighborhoods persist over time, even as the Black population declines,
crime rates remain low and effectively unchanged, the City’s overall social and
economic health improves, and housing and other investments increase across the
City’s neighborhoods, including its poorest and most segregated neighborhoods.
Third, there appears to be a declining return in crime detection from marginal
increases in enforcement, and this efficiency gap seems to grow over time.148

Living in geographical areas of New York City where SQF was aggressively
implemented appears to have negatively affected the mental health of the men
subjected to such aggressive and racialized surveillance. A study by sociologists
and public health scholars found that between 2009 and 2011, neighborhoodlevel frisk and use-of-force proportions were linked to higher levels of psychological distress among men in high SQF neighborhoods, including feelings of
nervousness and worthlessness.149
The racial focus of the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk program was acknowledged
(and minimized) by city and police department leaders.150 Former Mayor Michael Bloomberg stated publicly that, according to the department’s statistics on
violent crime suspects, “we disproportionately stop whites too much and minorities too little.”151 In 2013, an officer in the 40th precinct recorded his commanding officer directing him to stop “the right people, at the right time, at the right
location,” described as “male [B]lacks, 14 to 20, 21.”152 The Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) interviewed fifty-four people who had been subjected to
stop-and-frisk in order to paint a clearer picture of the “human impact” of the
stop-and-frisk program.153 The CCR concluded:
148
Jeffrey A. Fagan, Amanda Geller, Garth Davies & Valerie West, Street Stops and Broken
Windows Revisited: The Demography and Logic of Proactive Policing in a Safe and Changing
City, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND POLICING: NEW AND ESSENTIAL READINGS 309, 337 (Stephen
K. Rice & Michael D. White eds., 2010).
149
Abigail A. Sewell, Kevin A. Jefferson & Hedwig Lee, Living Under Surveillance: Gender,
Psychological Distress, and Stop-Question-and-Frisk Policing in New York City, 159 SOC.
SCI. & MED. 1, 9 (2016).
150
See, e.g., Ray Kelly, The NYPD: Guilty of Saving 7,383 Lives, WALL ST. J. (July 22, 2013,
7:14 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732444810457861633358871932
0 [https://perma.cc/5CGZ-YSH7].
151
Jennifer Fermino, Mayor Bloomberg on Stop-And-Frisk: It Can Be Argued ‘We Disproportionately Stop Whites Too Much. And Minorities Too Little’, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 28,
2013), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/mayor-bloomberg-stop-and-frisk-disproporti
onately-stop-whites-minorities-article-1.1385410 [https://perma.cc/RF2X-ZXRU].
152
Graham Rayman, New NYPD Tapes Introduced in Stop and Frisk Trial, VILLAGE VOICE
(Mar. 22, 2013), http://www.villagevoice.com/news/new-nypd-tapes-introduced-in-stop-andfrisk-trial-6721026 [https://perma.cc/FFF7-X6NR].
153
CTR. FOR CONST. RTS., supra note 14, at 3.
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These interviews provide evidence of how deeply this practice impacts individuals and they document widespread civil and human rights abuses . . . . The effects
of these abuses can be devastating and often leave behind lasting emotional, psychological, social, and economic harm. . . . Residents of some New York City
neighborhoods describe a police presence so pervasive and hostile that they feel
like they are living in a state of siege.154

The overt, racially charged statements by city and police leaders, along with
clear racial disproportionality in the administration of the stop-and-frisk program, illustrates the persistent undercurrent of racial injustice in New York City
policing and provides an important backdrop for the continued investigation of
the NYPD’s SQF activities.
D. Stop, Question, and Frisk in New York City Today
The New York City experience with SQF since the Floyd ruling largely calls
into question the crime decline argument. From 2011 to 2017, the number of
stops conducted by NYPD officers declined by approximately 98%, but this dramatic reduction in stops did not lead to increased crime.155 In fact, New York’s
decrease in the overall crime rate has continued. In 2016, New York reported a
record low for homicides; the decrease continued such that in 2018, New York
marked the lowest number of index crimes in nearly seventy years, including
robberies, burglaries, motor vehicle larcenies, and murders.156 In 2019, the number of homicides rose by twenty-three killings, representing an 8% increase—a
relatively small increase in terms of raw numbers for such a large city that “does
not necessarily signal a new upward trend.”157 Moreover, other index crimes in
New York City decreased by approximately 1% in 2019 from the prior year’s
record lows.158
As previously stated, the most recent SQF data from New York City indicated that people of color were involved in nearly nine out of every ten stops by

154

Id. at 1.
Michelle Shames & Simon McCormack, Stops and Frisks Plummeted Under New York
Mayor Bill de Blasio, but Racial Disparities Haven’t Budged, ACLU (Mar. 14, 2019, 4:00
PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-law-reform/reforming-police/stop-and-frisks-plummeted-under-new-york-mayor-bill-de [https://perma.cc/DL5S-7SN7].
156
Zolan Kanno-Youngs, New York City’s Murder Rate Hit New Low in 2018, WALL ST. J.
(Jan. 3, 2019, 3:56 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-york-citys-murder-rate-hit-newlow-in-2018-11546559793 [https://perma.cc/5A8B-JKY4]; see also New York City Achieves
Record-Breaking Low Crime in 2018, N.Y. POLICE DEP’T (Jan. 3, 2019), https://www1.nyc.go
v/site/nypd/news/p0103a/new-york-city-achieves-record-breaking-low-crime-2018#/0 [https:
//perma.cc/9ZCY-C9EC].
157
Edgar Sandoval, The Truth About New York’s Rising Murder Numbers, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/07/us/politics/nypd-crime-stats.html [https://per
ma.cc/C3VD-K3B2].
158
N.Y. CITY, SEVEN MAJOR FELONY OFFENSES (2020), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/nypd/d
ownloads/pdf/analysis_and_planning/historical-crime-data/seven-major-felony-offenses-200
0-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/5L4D-M9X9].
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the NYPD in 2019.159 The present study seeks to contextualize that figure by
analyzing the racial, ethnic, and sex breakdown of stop-and-frisks during 2019
in New York within the context of other situational factors.
IV. METHODS
A. Sources of Data
The present study relied on three data sources: NYPD stop-and-frisk data,
U.S. Census Bureau (2010) data, and official crime statistics from New York
City. The stop-and-frisk data for the current study are drawn from the NYPD’s
official SQF dataset that the NYPD updates annually and makes publicly available online.160 We used data from 2019 because that is the most current year for
which data are available to investigate the independent and joint effects of race,
ethnicity, and sex on key outcomes of interest, namely which persons are
stopped, frisked, and subjected to force.
The entirety of the SQF dataset is comprised of information from each individual stop NYPD officers make and document on an official form, known as
the UF-250 form.161 Officers are required to complete a UF-250 form if they use
force, if the person stopped refuses to identify himself or herself, or if the individual stopped is frisked, searched, and/or arrested.162 Prior to 2015, UF-250
forms primarily gathered the following data, often reporting it simply by officers
checking off applicable boxes:
•
•
•
•
•
•

159

The suspect’s sex, race, age, height, weight, hair color, eye color, and
other features such as scars and tattoos.
The location of the stop, including address number, street name, intersection, city, state, zip code, police beat, police section, and police borough, along with the longitudinal (X) and latitudinal (Y) coordinates.
The reason or reasons that led up to the stop, frisk, and/or search.
The reason for police use of force and the type of force employed.
Whether the suspect was frisked, searched, and/or arrested.
Whether contraband or a weapon was found on the suspect.163

NYCLU, SQF Data, supra note 16; NYCLU, DE BLASIO ERA, supra note 16, at 9.
NYCLU, SQF Data, supra note 16; Stop, Question, and Frisk Data, N.Y. POLICE DEP’T
[hereinafter NYPD, SQF Data], https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/stats/reports-analysis/stopfrisk.page [https://perma.cc/VF7D-RGJ7].
161
ELIOT SPITZER, THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT’S “STOP AND FRISK” PRACTICES:
A REPORT TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK FROM THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL 63 (1999).
162
Id. at 63–64.
163
Former Stanford University professor of computation journalism and ProPublica news application developer Dan Nguyen posted the old form on his blog along with a summary of the
challenges he has faced obtaining the revised form. See Dan Nguyen, NYPD Stop, Question,
and Frisk Worksheet (UF-250); My Attempt at Getting the Latest Version as ‘Just a Researcher’, THOUGHTS, DATA & COMPUTATIONAL JOURNALISM (Nov. 28, 2019), http://blog.dan
win.com/request-nypd-form-uf250/ [https://perma.cc/M637-YR75].
160

21 NEV. L.J. 1151

Spring 2021]

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF STOP AND FRISK

1175

The form was updated in 2015 “to include a narrative section where an officer must record, in his or her own words, the basis for the stop.”164 The new
form also contains a separate section for officers to explain why they conducted
a frisk.165 Although the new form is not publicly available,166 Table 1 provides a
description of the suspect- and encounter-level variables contained in the
NYPD’s 2019 SQF dataset used in the present study.
Additionally, macro- or community-level data from the U.S. Census Bureau
and New York City were combined with the encounter-level data to account for
citywide geographic variation in demographic characteristics and crime rates.167
The U.S. Census Bureau data were aggregated to the precinct level using apportionment in order to create the precinct-level variables for percent Black, percent
Hispanic, residential instability, and concentrated disadvantage.168 Finally, the
precinct-level crime data on felonies and misdemeanors were made available
online through New York City.169 The descriptions of all precinct-level variables
can be found in Table 1.
B. Independent Variables
The primary independent variables in this study are the race, ethnicity, and
sex of the suspect as recorded on the NYPD’s official stop forms. Although those
forms contain more options, race and ethnicity were coded as Black, Hispanic,
or White, with White as the reference group.170 As Table 2 shows, the final sample was 61% Black, 30% Hispanic, and 9% White, mirroring the percentages
reported by the New York Civil Liberties Union.171 The NYPD reports the sex

164
NYPD, NO. 14049620, COURT-ORDERED CHANGES TO NYPD PRACTICES AND POLICIES
RELATED TO STOPS AND FRISKS (2015), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/ccrb/downloads/pdf/investigations_pdf/20150302_finest-message-stop-frisk-pursuant-to-floyd.pdf [https://perma.c
c/8KG4-79QB].
165
Id.
166
Nguyen, supra note 163.
167
QuickFacts, New York City, New York, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Apr. 1, 2010), https://www.
census.gov/quickfacts/fact/dashboard/newyorkcitynewyork/PST040219 [https://perma.cc/6K
NE-KZDW] (containing 2010 data).
168
John R. Hipp, Violent Crime, Mobility Decisions, and Neighborhood Racial/Ethnic Transition, 58 SOC. PROBS. 410, 416–18 (2011).
169
Historical New York City Crime Data, N.Y. POLICE DEP’T, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nyp
d/stats/crime-statistics/historical.page [https://perma.cc/DQQ4-LT4S].
170
Consistent with prior research, we combined White Hispanic and Black Hispanic into a
single variable entitled “Hispanic.” See Ferrandino, supra note 12, at 210; Levchak, supra
note 12, at 378–80. We also excluded Asian/Pacific Islander, American Indian/Alaskan Native, and “others” from the analyses because there were too few stops involving people identified as belonging to these groups for meaningful statistical analyses. This, in turn, resulted
in a 3% reduction in sample size.
171
NYCLU, SQF Data, supra note 16.
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of people stopped as either male or female. Consequently, we coded the variable
dichotomously (0 = female, 1 = male). The final sample was 91% male.172

172
We recognize that science has debated the notion of two sexes as being simplistic. Many
biologists acknowledge “a more nuanced view of sex”—one that embraces “a wider spectrum”
than the outdated fallacy of dimorphic sex fixed at birth. See Claire Ainsworth, Sex Redefined,
518 NATURE 288, 288, 291 (2015). But the NYPD fails to capture data on transgender, intersex, and nonbinary people. Accordingly, our variable measuring sex is dichotomous.
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TABLE 1: VARIABLE NAMES AND DESCRIPTIONS
VARIABLE NAME
Dependent Variables
Frisked
Searched
Force

Independent Variables
Male
Race/Ethnicity
Control Variables
Age
Weight
Height
Multiple People
Stopped
Suspect Arrested
Engage in Violent
Crime
Known to Carry
Weapon
Casing a Victim/Location
Concealed
Weapon
Drug Transaction
Actions of Criminal Conduct
Acting as Lookout
Proximity of
Crime
Stop Initiation

DESCRIPTION
Dichotomous variable indicating whether the suspect was
frisked
Dichotomous variable indicating whether the suspect was
searched
Dummy variables were created for the types of force, including no force, handcuff force, weapon force, and other
force
Dummy categories were created for male and female
Dummy categories were created for White, Black, and Hispanic
Individual’s age in years
Individual’s weight measured in pounds
Individual’s height measured in inches
Multiple people were stopped during the SQF
Suspect was arrested at some point during police contact
Suspect engaged in actions indicative of a violent crime
The suspect is known by police to carry a weapon
Suspect cased a victim or location
Suspect engaged in actions indicative of a concealed
weapon
Suspect engaged in actions indicative of a drug transaction
Suspect engaged in actions indicative of criminal behavior
Suspected acted as a lookout
Suspect was in proximity to scene of offense
Dummy variables indicating the source of the stop, including officer initiation, dispatch initiation, or C/W on scene
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Suspected Crime
Description

Percent Black
Percent Hispanic
Residential Instability
Concentrated Disadvantage

Violent Crime
Rate (logged)
Misdemeanor
Crime Rate
(logged)
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Dummy variables for suspected crime included petit larceny, grand larceny, robbery, assault, burglary, menacing,
CPW, criminal trespass, grand larceny auto, other, criminal
mischief, terrorism, possession of controlled substance, sale
of marijuana, sale of controlled substance, CPSP, auto
stripping, forcible touching, possession of marijuana, murder, unauthorized use of vehicle, graffiti, reckless endangerment, prostitution, theft of services, and possession of
forged instrument
The racial composition of each precinct for blacks
The ethnic composition of each precinct for Hispanics
Residential instability was an index measure that includes
percent individuals residing in same house for one year,
percent foreign born, and percent vacant houses.
Concentrated disadvantage was an index variable that includes percent female-headed households with dependents,
percent persons in poverty, percent adult unemployment,
and percent households receiving public assistance.
Reflects NYPD reported homicide, robbery, aggravated assaults, and forcible rape per 100,000 residents
Reflects NYPD reported misdemeanors per 100,000 residents, which includes possession of stolen property, sex
crimes, dangerous drugs, dangerous weapons, petit larceny,
assault, intoxicated/impaired driving, vehicle/traffic laws,
criminal mischief, criminal trespass, unauthorized use of
vehicle, offense against person, offense against public administration, fraud, aggravated harassment, and other misdemeanors
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TABLE 2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, 2019 (N =12,573)
Dependent Variables
Frisked
Searched
Force
No Force
Handcuff Force
Weapon Force
Other
Encounter-Level Variables
Male
White
Black
Hispanic
Age
Weight
Height
Multiple People Stopped
Suspect Arrested
Engaged in Violent Crime
Known to Carry Weapon
Casing a Victim/Location
Concealed Weapon
Drug Transaction
Actions of Criminal Conduct
Acting as Lookout
Proximity of Crime
Stop Initiation
Officer Initiation
Dispatch Initiation
C/W on Scene
Suspected Crime Description
Precinct-Level Variables
Percent Black
Percent Hispanic
Residential Instability
Concentrated Disadvantage
Violent Crime Rate (logged)
Misdemeanor Crime Rate (logged)

n

Percent

Mean

7,213
4,655

57.40%
37.50%

-------

9,447
2,251
537
338

75.10%
17.90%
4.30%
2.70%

-------------

11,439
1,101
7,712
3,760
---------4,966
4,035
3,760
440
503
2,074
163
151
239
5,809

91.00%
9.00%
61.00%
30.00%
---------39.50%
32.10%
30.00%
3.50%
4.00%
16.50%
1.30%
1.20%
1.90%
46.20%

------------28.20
167.10
67.70
-------------------------------

2,892
7,732
1,949
----

23.00%
61.50%
15.50%
----

-------------

-------------------

-------------------

29.60
30.90
-0.10
-0.10
7.20
8.20
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C. Dependent Variables
For each NYPD stop reported in 2019, we analyzed the factors associated
with whether the person stopped was subsequently subjected to either a frisk, a
full search, or the application of force by police. The variable frisked was a dichotomous outcome in which the data were coded as 0 (not frisked) or 1
(frisked). Similarly, the variable searched was a dichotomous outcome in which
the data were coded as 0 (not searched) or 1 (searched). As Tables 2 and 3 reveal,
police frisked 57.4% of the individuals they stopped, whereas they searched
37.5% of the people stopped. The NYPD dataset has several categories for use
of force, which includes pointing firearm, handcuffing suspect, using oleoresin
capsicum (OC) spray, restraining suspect, verbally instructing suspect, using an
impact weapon, and a final category entitled other. In 2019, the NYPD did not
report any use of force incidents involving OC spray or restraint. Conversely,
there were five cases involving an impact weapon and 532 incidents where a
police officer pointed their firearm. Handcuff force was reported in 2,251 cases,
and officers used verbal force in 11,601 encounters. For the analysis, use of force
was limited to physical force. Due to the small sample size associated with impact weapons, a new variable entitled weapon force was created that combined
impact weapon with officers that pointed their weapon. The final variables for
use of force included no force (75.10%), handcuff force (17.90%), weapon force
(4.30%), and other force (2.70%).
D. Control Variables
The control variables fall into two different categories: encounter-level and
precinct-level variables. The encounter-level variables can be further delineated
between suspects’ physical characteristics and circumstantial characteristics.
1. Physical Characteristics
The control variables for suspects’ physical characteristics include age,
weight, and height. Age is a continuous variable with a mean of 28.2 years old
and a range from 5 to 83 years old. Weight is a continuous variable with a mean
of 167.1 pounds and a range from 60 to 400 pounds. Height is a continuous variable with a mean of 67.7 inches (nearly 5 feet, 8 inches) and a range from 48
inches (4 feet) to 96 inches (8 feet).
2. Circumstantial Characteristics of the Encounter
The circumstantial characteristics of the SQF encounter are documented by
NYPD officers in the UF-250 forms. Importantly, the circumstantial characteristics are pieces of information that are garnered by officers both prior to and
during a stop. As such, these control variables provide important encounter-level
details that may help explain why a suspect was subjected to a frisk, search, or
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force, which helps ensure that the analysis does not suffer from model misspecification.
A total of twelve variables were included in the analysis to account for circumstantial characteristics: multiple people stopped, suspect arrested,173 engaged in violent crime, known to carry weapon, casing a victim/location, concealed weapon, drug transaction, actions of criminal conduct, acting as a
lookout, proximity of crime, stop initiation, and suspected crime description. A
description of all circumstantial characteristics can be found in Table 1, with
their corresponding descriptive statistics found in Table 2.
3. Precinct Characteristics
These control variables capture ecological variation at the precinct level,
which included percent Black, percent Hispanic, residential instability, concentrated disadvantage, violent crime rate, and misdemeanor crime rate. The percentages of precinct residents who are Black or Hispanic were calculated using
U.S. Census Bureau data. Percent Black and percent Hispanic ranged from
0.75% to 88.24% and 6.03% to 74.29%, respectively. These variables were included in the analysis because prior research has found that percent Black and
percent Hispanic are sometimes associated with heightened levels of formal social control (i.e., more policing) because they are perceived as being a threatening population.174
Residential instability and concentrated disadvantage were also created using data from the U.S. Census Bureau. The variable residential instability captures the social disruptions within a precinct that may attenuate the formation of
social ties that combat crime.175 The variable concentrated disadvantage
measures the level of economic deprivation within a precinct.176 Both residential
instability and concentrated disadvantage variables rely on principal component
analysis (“PCA”) to extract summary components. “PCA analyzes a data table
representing observations described by several dependent variables, which are,
173
The variable suspect arrested was included in the analysis for the models examining the
outcome search. If someone is arrested, it is NYPD policy that the arrested individual is
searched. See NYPD, PATROL GUIDE: ARRESTS – GENERAL SEARCH GUIDELINES, PROC. NO.
208-05 (2013), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/ccrb/downloads/pdf/investigations_pdf/pg20805-strip-search.pdf [https://perma.cc/PKH5-2AGD]. By accounting for the variable suspect
arrested, the analysis more accurately reports findings on individuals who were searched in
the process of the stop-and-frisk tactic.
174
See, e.g., Brad W. Smith & Malcolm D. Holmes, Police Use of Excessive Force in Minority
Communities: A Test of the Minority Threat, Place, and Community Accountability Hypotheses, 61 SOC. PROBS. 83, 85 (2014).
175
Lyndsay N. Boggess & John R. Hipp, Violent Crime, Residential Instability and Mobility:
Does the Relationship Differ in Minority Neighborhoods?, 26 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY
351, 352 (2010).
176
Alyssa W. Chamberlain & John R. Hipp, It’s All Relative: Concentrated Disadvantage
Within and Across Neighborhoods and Communities, and the Consequences for Neighborhood Crime, 43 J. CRIM. JUST. 431, 431 (2015).
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in general inter-correlated. Its goal is to extract the important information from
the data table and to express this information as a set of new orthogonal variables
called principal components.”177 In lay terms, PCA transforms highly related indicators into a single variable (i.e., the component) that best summarizes the data
from all indicators. We created the residential instability variable, for instance,
using three indicators: the percentage of people in the precinct who were born
outside of the United States, the percentage of vacant homes, and the percentage
of individuals residing in the same home for at least one year (with lower values
indicating greater instability). Similarly, we created the concentrated disadvantage variable using four indicators: percent female-headed households with
dependents, percent persons in poverty, percent adult unemployment, and percent households receiving public assistance. All the indicators for residential instability and concentrated disadvantage had factor loadings above 0.68, which
suggests the indicators are adequately related to one another and the concepts of
interest.
Lastly, the NYPD’s raw data on the number of felony and misdemeanor offenses in each precinct were standardized per 100,000 citizens. These variables
were log transformed178 to reduce their skewed nature and meet the assumptions
of inferential statistics.179 The crime types captured by these variables are reported in Table 1, with their corresponding descriptive statistics in Table 2.
E. Analytic Strategy
Examining the independent and joint effects of race, ethnicity, and gender
on the outcomes of interest proceeded in three stages. First, the descriptive statistics and cross tabulations were reviewed to better understand which social
groups were subjected to frisks, searches, and force by the NYPD. Second, inferential statistics were employed to analyze the independent and joint effects of
race, ethnicity, and gender on the likelihood of being frisked and searched by the
NYPD. Finally, the relationship between race, ethnicity, sex, and the different

177
Hervé Abdi & Lynne J. Williams, Principal Component Analysis, 2 WIRES
COMPUTATIONAL STAT. 433, 433 (2010).
178
The log transformation is a common method in biomedical and psychosocial research to
deal with skewed data—that is, data that are not normally distributed and, therefore, violate
the assumptions of many statistical tests. To address the problem, log transformations use
algebra to normalize the data as much as possible, thereby increasing the validity of the associated statistical analyses. See, e.g., Jason W. Osborne, Improving Your Data Transformations: Applying the Box-Cox Transformation, 15 PRAC. ASSESSMENT, RSCH. & EVALUATION
1, 2–3 (2010).
179
Jason W. Osborne & Elaine Waters, Four Assumptions of Multiple Regression That Researchers Should Always Test, 8 PRAC. ASSESSMENT, RSCH. & EVALUATION 1, 1 (2002); Matt
N. Williams, Carlos A. Gómez Grajales & Dason Kurkiewicz, Assumptions of Multiple Regression: Correcting Two Misconceptions, 18 PRAC. ASSESSMENT, RSCH. & EVALUATION 1,
2–3 (2013).
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categories for police use of force were examined using Pearson’s Chi-Square
tests.180
Statistically speaking, the main-effect models focus on the independent effects of race, ethnicity, and gender, whereas the joint-effect models focus on the
interactive effects (or intersectionality) of the aforementioned demographic variables. More simply, the main-effect models examine whether the NYPD frisks
or searches of males differ significantly from those of females and whether there
are significant disparities that existed between White, Black, and Hispanic individuals in terms of frisks and searches. The joint-effect models provide added
nuance to the analyses by examining how different combinations of sex, race,
and ethnicity compare to each other. Such analysis, for example, allows for
White males to be compared to Hispanic females in the context of SQF encounters.
To examine the main and joint effects of race, ethnicity, and gender on the
likelihood of being frisked and searched by the NYPD, multilevel logistic regression was selected as the appropriate analysis. Logistic regression is typically
used when the dependent variable is dichotomous—in other words, there are
only two possible outcomes, such as not being frisked (coded 0) or being frisked
(coded 1). Additionally, we combined logistic regression with a multilevel modeling strategy because many SQFs occurred within the same precinct, meaning
the data were nested within 77 NYPD precincts181 and could, therefore, violate
the statistical assumption of independence.182 Because multi-level logistic regression technique corrects for this, it is the appropriate tool for analyzing NYPD
SQF data as coded in this study.183
The examination of police use of force relies on bivariate analyses to determine whether significant differences existed between race/ethnicity, sex, and the
four categorical variables for force. Specifically, we use the Pearson’s ChiSquare test to analyze if there are any statistically significant differences between
categorical variables, and we also report Cramer’s V statistics to assess the

180
Using Chi-Square Statistic in Research, STAT. SOLS., https://www.statisticssolutions.com/
using-chi-square-statistic-in-research/ [https://perma.cc/9Q3Q-8WEK].
181
In line with previous studies conducted by a variety of respected researchers, data from
Central Park (Precinct 22) was not included in the analysis because it is nonresidential. See
Cerdá, Messner, Tracy, Vlahov, Goldmann, Tardiff & Galea, supra note 142, at 1108; Preeti
Chauhan, Magdalena Cerdá, Steven F. Messner, Melissa Tracy, Kenneth Tardiff & Sandro
Galea, Race/Ethnic-Specific Homicide Rates in New York City: Evaluating the Impact of Broken Windows Policing and Crack Cocaine Markets, 15 HOMICIDE STUD. 268, 272 (2011);
Ferrandino, supra note 12, at 210; Levchak, supra note 12, at 378; Steven F. Messner, Sandro
Galea, Kenneth J. Tardiff, Melissa Tracy, Angela Bucciarelli, Tina Markham Piper, Victoria
Frye & David Vlahov, Policing, Drugs, and the Homicide Decline in New York City in the
1990s, 45 CRIMINOLOGY 385, 391 (2007).
182
See sources cited supra notes 178–179.
183
See STEPHEN W. RAUDENBUSH & ANTHONY S. BRYK, HIERARCHICAL LINEAR MODELS:
APPLICATIONS AND DATA ANALYSIS METHODS xx (2d ed. 2002).
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strength of any association.184 Chi-square tests were used to analyze use of force
instead of regression-based techniques because there were so few use-of-force
incidents. For example, there were only seven Hispanic females who had weapon
force used on them during an SQF. Because the counts for use-of-force incidents
were so low, especially for certain social groups, it is difficult for meaningful
comparisons to be made using regression-based analysis.
F. Data Limitations
There are several limitations associated with the datasets used for analysis.
First and foremost, this study uses NYPD administrative data that several critics
have suggested are incomplete and inaccurate. In fact, there are indications that
a substantial proportion of stops occur without formal documentation. Consider
that Jones-Brown and colleagues reported in 2013 that although one study estimated that approximately 70% of all stops were captured on UF-250 forms, an
NYPD commander estimated that “only 1 in 10 stops” was documented by officers on the UF-250.185 With the new form requiring officers to complete narrative explanations to justify SQF activities, there are even more reasons to question the completeness of the NYPD’s data. “The monitor overseeing police stops
has repeatedly cited underreporting as a serious problem.”186 And because the
NYPD employs approximately 22,000 police officers and sergeants (the ranks
of those who are likely to make stops), the fact that only 13,500 were reported in
2019 seems—in the words of the legal director of the New York Civil Liberties
Union—“suspiciously low.”187 As a result, the data may only provide a conservative estimate and may not be representative of the individuals that are actually
stopped by the NYPD. Nonetheless, they are the best available data for analyzing
the present study’s research questions.
There are also limitations associated with how the data were apportioned
and aggregated to the precinct level. The sizes of precincts may be such large
units of analysis that it does not account for community-level variation at smaller
units of analysis like census blocks or census tracts.188 Given the heterogenous
nature of New York City, it is possible that the aggregation of precinct-level
characteristics may over- or under-represent the racial or ethnic composition of
neighborhoods, as well as associated variables such as residential instability,
concentrated disadvantage, and the number of felonies and misdemeanors reported.

184

RONET D. BACHMAN & RAYMOND PATERNOSTER, STATISTICS FOR CRIMINOLOGY AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 634, 637 (4th ed. 2017).
185
JONES-BROWN ET AL., supra note 120, at 3; see also Weisburd et al., supra note 118, at
148; Rosenfeld & Fornango, supra note 143, at 98.
186
Khan, supra note 15.
187
Id.
188
Jerry H. Ratcliffe & Michael J. McCullagh, Hotbeds of Crime and the Search for Spatial
Accuracy, 1 J. GEOGRAPHICAL SYS. 385, 395–96 (1999).
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Finally, it is challenging to estimate on-street population in New York City.
Due to tourism, commuting, and other factors, daily foot traffic may vary from
the precinct-level variables that account for percent Black and percent Hispanic.
Note, however, that smaller geographic units of analysis would not necessarily
be more accurate:
[T]his cannot be resolved by analyzing post-stop outcomes at a different unit of
analysis (i.e., census tracts or blocks). Using a smaller unit of analysis has the
potential to make it less likely that the racial composition of the unit matches the
racial composition of the on-street population. Given the smaller size of blocks,
people will be more likely to pass between Census blocks than between precincts.189

Recognizing these limitations, we follow what previous researchers have
done by aggregating U.S. Census Bureau data to the precinct level, thereby maintaining congruency between the NYPD dataset and the macro-level variables in
this study.190
V. RESULTS
A. Descriptive Statistics
In 2019, the NYPD recorded a total of 13,459 stops.191 Due to missing data
and listwise deletion, the total sample size for this study was 12,573, which represents a 6.6% reduction in sample size from the original NYPD dataset; it did
not significantly impact the demographic characteristics of the study.192
The NYPD officially reported 7,213 frisks and 4,655 searches during 2019,
totaling 11,868 documented instances of NYPD officers putting hands on a citizen to look for contraband.193 These encounters yielded a total of 1,177 weapons,
meaning that weapons were recovered in 9.9% of hands-on events.194

189

Levchak, supra note 12, at 386.
Ferrandino, supra note 12, at 218; Joseph A. Ferrandino, The Effectiveness and Equity of
NYPD Stop and Frisk Policy, 2003–2014, 41 J. CRIME & JUST. 119, 124–25 (2018); Levchak,
supra note 12, at 378; Morrow, White & Fradella, supra note 12, at 375. This approach has
the added benefit of offering insights at a level useful to police because precincts “organize,
constrain, and define an officer’s understanding” of the work environment. Weston J. Morrow,
Emily R. Berthelot & Samuel G. Vickovic, Police Use of Force: An Examination of the Minority Threat Perspective, 31 CRIM. JUST. STUD. 368, 375 (2018).
191
NYCLU, SQF Data, supra note 16.
192
To compare and contrast our data with the original dataset, see id. and NYPD, SQF Data,
supra note 160.
193
NYPD, SQF Data, supra note 160.
194
Unfortunately, the NYPD’s dataset does not specify whether these weapons were discovered during a frisk or a more comprehensive search, so we report the overall “hit” rate for
weapons for hands-on events to investigate whether a suspect is armed.
190
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1. Race and Ethnicity
The descriptive statistics presented in Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5 reveal several
trends among officers stopping, frisking, searching, and using force on New
Yorkers. As Table 2 illustrates, Blacks, Hispanics, and Whites accounted for
61%, 30%, and 9% of individuals stopped by the police, respectively. Thus, a
whopping 91% of the individuals NYPD stopped were either Black or Hispanic.
And as Tables 3 and 4 indicate, Blacks and Hispanics were frisked and searched
more often by the NYPD than their White counterparts. Of the individuals
stopped, Black and Hispanic people were frisked 36% and 18% of the time in
comparison to 4% for White people. Additionally, Blacks and Hispanics were
searched in 22% and 12% of incidents, respectively, whereas White individuals
were searched in only 3.5% of SQF encounters. Table 5 reveals that the NYPD
used force more often against Black and Hispanic individuals than Whites. Specifically, Blacks and Hispanics were subjected to weapons-level force in 2.75%
and 1.10% of SQF encounters compared to only 0.45% of the time for Whites.
Put differently, Black and Hispanic New Yorkers were approximately 6.1 and
2.4 times more likely, respectively, to have weapon force used against them than
Whites. And, as Table 5 illustrates, similar racial and ethnic differences exist for
the other force categories.

21 NEV. L.J. 1151

TABLE 3: FRISKS BY RACE AND GENDER
Black

Not
Frisked

Subtotals

White

Male

Female

Total
Blacks

Male

Female

n

4,301

205

4,506

2,129

91

Total
Hispanics
2,220

% of all
stops
n

(34.2%)

(1.6%)

(35.8%)

(16.9%)

(0.7%)

2,718

488

3,206

1,346

% of all
stops
n

(21.6%)

(3.9%)

(25.5%)

7,019

693

% of all
stops

(55.83
%)

(5.51%)

Outcome

Frisked

Hispanic

Female

Total
Whites

Total

Male
443

44

487

7,213

(17.7%)

(3.5%)

(0.3%)

(3.9%)

(57.4%)

194

1,540

502

112

614

5,360

(10.7%)

(1.5%)

(12.2%)

(4.0%)

(0.9%)

(4.9%)

(42.6%)

7,712

3,475

285

3,760

945

156

1,101

12,573

(61.34
%)

(27.64
%)

(2.27%)

(29.91
%)

(7.52%)

(1.24%)

(8.76%)

(100.0%)
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TABLE 4: SEARCHES BY RACE/ETHNICITY AND GENDER
Black

Not
Searched

Subtotals

White

Male

Female

Total
Blacks

Male

Female

n

2,552

206

2,758

1,379

90

Total
Hispanics
1,469

% of all
stops
n

(20.3%)

(1.6%)

(21.9%)

(11.0%)

(0.7%)

4,467

487

4,954

2,096

% of all
stops
n

(35.5%)

(3.9%)

(39.4%)

7,019

693

% of all
stops

(55.83
%)

(5.51%)

Outcome

Searched

Hispanic

Female

Total
Whites

Total

Male
379

49

428

4,655

(11.7%)

(3.0%)

(0.4%)

(3.4%)

(37.0%)

195

2,291

566

107

673

7,918

(16.7%)

(1.6%)

(18.2%)

(4.5%)

(0.9%)

(5.4%)

(63.0%)

7,712

3,475

285

3,760

945

156

1,101

12,573

(61.34
%)

(27.64
%)

(2.27%)

(29.91
%)

(7.52%)

(1.24%)

(8.76%)

(100.0%)
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TABLE 5: POLICE USES OF FORCE DURING SQFS BY RACE/ETHNICITY AND GENDER
Black

Handcuff
Force
Other
Force
All Uses
of Force

No Force

Subtotals

White

Male

Female

Total
Blacks

Male

Female

n

329

19

348

129

7

Total
Hispanics
136

% of all
stops
n

(2.62%)

(0.15%)

(2.77%)

(1.03%)

(0.06%)

1,322

116

1,438

599

% of all
stops
n

(10.51
%)
187

(0.92%)
21

(11.44
%)
208

% of all
stops
n

(1.49%)

(0.17%)

1,838

% of all
stops
n

Outcome

Weapons
Force

Hispanic

Female

Total
Whites

Total

Male
47

6

53

537

(1.08%)

(0.37%)

(0.05%)

0.42%

4.27%

46

645

146

22

168

2,251

(4.76)%

(0.37%)

(5.13%)

(1.16%)

(0.17%)

(1.34)%

(17.90%)

86

6

92

34

4

38

338

(1.65%)

(0.68%)

(0.05%)

(0.73%)

(0.27%)

(0.03)%

(0.30%)

(2.26%)

156

1,994

814

59

873

227

32

259

3,126

(14.62
%)
5,181

(1.24%)

(15.86
%)
5,718

(6.47%)

(0.47%)

(6.94%)

(1.81%)

(0.25%)

(2.06%)

(24.86)%

2,661

226

2,887

718

124

842

9,447

% of all
stops
n

(41.21
%)
7,019

(4.27%)

(45.48
%)
7,712

(21.16
%)
3,475

(1.80%)

(23.96
%)
3,760

(5.71%)

(0.99%)

(6.70%)

(75.14%)

945

156

1,101

12,573

% of all
stops

(55.83
%)

(5.51%)

(61.34
%)

(27.64
%)

(2.27%)

(29.91
%)

(7.52%)

(1.24%)

(8.76%)

(100.0%)

537

693

285
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2. Sex
Ninety-one percent of SQFs involved male suspects; females were involved
in only 9% of stops. Similarly, dramatic differences on the basis of sex manifest
in frisks, searches, and force. Males were frisked in 55% and searched in 34% of
the incidents, whereas females were frisked in only 2.7% and searched in 2.73%
of SQFs. Regarding force, males had handcuff force, weapon force, and other
force used against them 16.50%, 4.00%, and 2.50% of the time, respectively.
Females had handcuff force, weapon force, and other force used against them
1.50%, 0.25%, and 0.25% of the time, respectively.
Tables 3, 4, and 5 reveal data that explain how the intersection of sex with
race and ethnicity affect frisk, search, and force outcomes during SQFs. The results highlight how examining race and ethnicity independently from sex can
skew the outcomes for certain groups of people. Specifically, Black and Hispanic
males were frisked in 34% and 17% of SQFs, whereas White males, White females, Black females, and Hispanic females were frisked in 3.42%, 0.35%,
1.36%, and 0.72% of SQFs, respectively. Likewise, Black and Hispanic males
were searched far more often than the others—20% and 11%, respectively. In
comparison, White males, White females, Black females, and Hispanic females
were searched in 3%, 0.39%, 1.64%, and 0.71% of SQFs, respectively.
The results in Table 5 also reveal that Black and Hispanic males were most
often subjected to force in comparison to the other social groups. NYPD officers
used handcuff force against Black and Hispanic males 10.55% and 4.73% of the
time, respectively; weapon force 2.62% and 1.03% of the time, respectively; and
other force 1.49% and 0.68% of the time, respectively. All other social groups
were far less likely to have force used against them. White males, for example,
experienced handcuff force 1.15% of the time and weapon force 0.37% of the
time, which means Black males were approximately 9.17 and 7.08 times more
likely to have handcuff force and weapon force used against them in comparison
to their White counterparts.
B. Inferential Statistics
1. Main Effect Models
The multilevel logistic regression presented in Table 6 reveals that there
were a number of encounter-level variables that influenced the odds of being
frisked and searched by the NYPD. In the model examining the odds of being
frisked (Table 6, Model 1), the only significant suspect characteristics were sex
and age. As Model 1 indicates, the odds of being frisked were 2.67 times greater
for males than females. For age, there was a significant curvilinear relationship,
meaning that as individuals get older, they were less likely to be frisked by the
police. It is important to note that none of the variables for race and ethnicity
were significant in the main-effect models.
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TABLE 6: MULTILEVEL LOGISTIC REGRESSION OUTPUT—MAIN EFFECT MODELS
Model 1: Frisked
Odds
Stnd.
Ratio
Error
Suspect Variables
Gender
Whitea
Black
Hispanic
Age
Ageb
Weight
Height
Encounter-Level Variables
Multiple People Stopped
Suspect Arrested
Engaged in Violent
Crime
Known to Carry Weapon
Casing a Victim/Location
Concealed Weapon
Drug Transaction
Actions of Criminal Conduct
Acting as Lookout
Proximity of Crime
Officer Initiationa
Dispatch Initiation
C/W on Scene
Suspected Crime Description
Precinct-Level Variables
Percent Black
Percent Hispanic
Residential Instability
Concentrated Disadvantage
Violent Crime Rate
(logged)
Misdemeanor Crime
Rate (logged)
Constant

2.67***
--1.02
1.15
1.03*
0.99*
0.99
1.03

0.29
--0.11
0.13
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.08

1.07
--198.78***

Model 2: Searched
Odds
Stnd.
Ratio
Error
1.74***
--0.93
1.06
0.99
1.00
0.99
1.09

0.16
--0.09
0.10
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.07

0.07

0.77***

0.04

--28.58

17.53***
1.62***

0.97
0.10

60.26***
0.98

28.05
0.15

1.13
0.85

0.14
0.12

2.40***
1.75*
1.28

0.26
0.45
0.32

1.59***
1.95**
1.08

0.12
0.49
0.24

0.69
0.95
--0.81*
0.82
---

0.14
0.06
--0.07
0.08
---

0.91
0.91
--0.83*
0.97
---

0.17
0.05
--0.06
0.09
---

1.01
0.99
1.07
1.25

0.00
0.00
0.08
0.15

0.99
0.99
1.11
0.94

0.00
0.00
0.07
0.09

1.21

0.39

0.64

0.17

0.86

0.27

1.63

0.44

0.10

0.15

0.06*

0.08
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a

Reference category
Each model controlled for the suspected crime descriptions. For aesthetic appeal, the results are not
reported because there are 26 different categories.
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001
b

The most robust predictors of being frisked were the circumstantial characteristics of the encounter. Specifically, the odds of being frisked were 198.78 and
60.26 times greater for individuals whom officers believed had engaged in violent crime or whom police knew were suspects who carried weapons. Additionally, the odds of an officer frisking someone was 2.40 and 1.75 times greater,
respectively, if the officer believed that the individual’s actions were indicative
of a concealed weapon (as opposed to being actually known as a carrier of weapons) or a drug transaction. Finally, the odds of being frisked were 0.81 times
lower for individuals if the stop was initiated by dispatch instead of by the officer
on the scene.
The second main effect model (Table 6, Model 2) found that encounter-level
variables influenced the odds of being searched. Similar to Model 1, none of the
variables for race and ethnicity were significant in the model examining the odds
of being searched. The only significant suspect characteristic was sex. The odds
of being searched by the NYPD were 1.74 times greater for males than females.
The findings for circumstantial characteristics reveal that being arrested significantly increases the odds of being searched. Specifically, the odds of being
searched were 17.43 times greater for individuals that were arrested by the police. This is not surprising given that the NYPD is trained to conduct a search
upon arrest.195 Individuals also had higher odds of being searched if their actions
were indicative of a violent crime (OR = 1.62),196 a concealed weapon (OR =
195

See NYPD, PATROL GUIDE: ARRESTS – GENERAL PROCESSING, PROC. NO. 208-03 (2016),
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/ccrb/downloads/pdf/investigations_pdf/pg208-03-arrest-processing-strip-search.pdf [https://perma.cc/X87H-2678].
196
“OR” is the standard abbreviation for odds-ratio, which “is a measure of association between an exposure and an outcome. The OR represents the odds that an outcome will occur
given a particular exposure, compared to the odds of the outcome occurring in the absence of
that exposure.” Magdalena Szumilas, Explaining Odds Ratios, 19 J. CAN. ACAD. CHILD &
ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 227, 227 (2010).
Probability means the risk of an event happening divided by the total number of people at risk of
having that event. I will use the example in a recent JAMA article. In a deck of 52 cards, there are
13 spades. So, the risk (or probability) of drawing a card randomly from the deck and getting
spades is 13/52 = 0.25 = 25%. The numerator is the number of spades, and the denominator is the
total number of cards.
Odds seems less intuitive. It is the ratio of the probability a thing will happen over the probability
it won’t. In the spades example, the probability of drawing a spade is 0.25. The probability of not
drawing a spade is 1–0.25. So the odds is 0.25/0.75 or 1:3 (or 0.33 or 1/3 pronounced 1 to 3
odds) . . .

Clay Smith, Idiot’s Guide to Odds Ratios, J. FEED (Dec. 8, 2018), https://journalfeed.org/article-a-day/2018/idiots-guide-to-odds-ratios [https://perma.cc/PH3J-8PA3]. Put differently, and
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1.59), or a drug transaction (OR = 1.95). Conversely, individuals had lower odds
of being searched if multiple people were stopped (OR = 0.77) or the stop was
initiated by police dispatchers via their police radios (OR = 0.83) in comparison
to being initiated by the officer.
2. Joint Effect Models
The joint effects of gender and race on the outcomes were examined using
six different categorical variables (White male, Black male, Hispanic male,
White female, Black female, and Hispanic female). The models in Tables 7 and
8 suggest that the findings from the main effect models (Table 6) distort the true
impact of race, ethnicity, and sex on frisk and search outcomes. The models in
Tables 7 and 8 were identical with the exception of the reference group for the
gender-by-race/ethnicity categories. In Table 7, the reference group was White
males, whereas the reference group was White females in Table 8. We varied the
reference group in order to examine within-gender differences among the racial
and ethnic categories in addition to between-gender differences. According to
Model 3 (Table 7), the odds of being frisked were 1.26 times greater for Hispanic
males in comparison to White males. Additionally, the odds of being frisked
were 0.39 and 0.43 times lower for Black and Hispanic females, respectively,
than White males. In Model 4 (Table 7), Black and Hispanic males did not have
higher odds of being searched in comparison to White males. Similar to Model
3, however, the odds of being searched were 0.59, 0.59, and 0.60 times lower for
White, Black, and Hispanic females in comparison to White males. The findings
from all of the other suspect and circumstantial characteristics were nearly identical to those reported in the main effect models.

using the context of the present study, “[o]dds ratios are used to compare the relative odds of
the occurrence of the outcome of interest” (e.g. whether a suspect is stopped, frisked, searched,
or subjected to the use of force by police) “given exposure to the variable of interest” (e.g.,
race/ethnicity or sex). Szumilas, supra, at 227.
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TABLE 7: MULTILEVEL LOGISTIC REGRESSION OUTPUT—
JOINT EFFECT MODELS WITH WHITE MEN AS REFERENCE GROUP
Model 3: Frisked
Odds
Stnd.
Ratio
Error
Suspect Variables
White Malea
Black Male
Hispanic Male
White Female
Black Female
Hispanic Female
Age
Ageb
Weight
Height
Encounter-Level Variables
Multiple People Stopped
Suspect Arrested
Engaged in Violent Crime
Known to Carry Weapon
Casing a Victim/Location
Concealed Weapon
Drug Transaction
Actions of Criminal Conduct
Acting as Lookout
Proximity of Crime
Officer Initiationa
Dispatch Initiation
C/W on Scene
Suspected Crime Descriptionb
Precinct-Level Variables
Percent Black
Percent Hispanic
Residential Instability
Concentrated Disadvantage
Violent Crime Rate
(logged)

Model 4: Searched
Odds
Stnd.
Ratio
Error

--1.12
1.26*
0.63
0.39***
0.43***
1.03*
0.99*
1.00
1.02

--0.12
0.14
0.17
0.06
0.10
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.08

--0.98
1.12
0.59*
0.59***
0.60**
0.99
1.00
0.99
1.09

--0.09
0.11
0.14
0.08
0.11
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.07

1.06
--201.87***
60.58***
0.98
2.42***
1.69
1.24

0.07
--29.05
28.20
0.15
0.26
0.43
0.31

0.77***
17.55***
1.63***
1.13
0.84
1.60***
1.92**
1.05

0.04
0.97
0.10
0.14
0.11
0.12
0.48
0.23

0.69
0.95
--0.80**
0.82
---

0.14
0.06
--0.07
0.08
---

0.92
0.91
--0.83**
0.97
---

0.17
0.05
--0.06
0.09
---

1.01
0.99
1.07
1.25

0.00
0.00
0.08
0.15

0.99
0.99
1.11
0.94

0.00
0.00
0.07
0.09

1.19

0.38

0.64

0.17
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(logged)
Constant
Notes

0.87

0.28

1.60

1195
0.43

0.26
0.39
0.11
0.14
Reference category
b
Each model controlled for the suspected crime
descriptions. For aesthetic appeal, the results are
not reported because there are 26 different categories.
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001
a

The output reported in Table 8 used White females as the reference group
for the gender-by-race/ethnicity comparisons. Model 5 indicates that the odds of
Black females being frisked were 0.61 times lower than White females. Additionally, the odds of being frisked were 1.61, 1.75, and 1.98 times greater for
White, Black, and Hispanic males, respectively, than White females. In the
model examining the odds of being searched (Model 6), there were no significant
within-gender differences among females. Akin to Model 5, however, the odds
of being searched were 1.88, 1.74, and 1.99 times higher for White, Black, and
Hispanic males in comparison to White females. The findings from the remaining suspect and circumstantial characteristics are almost identical to those reported in the main effect models.
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TABLE 8: MULTILEVEL LOGISTIC REGRESSION OUTPUT—JOINT EFFECT MODELS WITH
WHITE FEMALES AS REFERENCE GROUP
Model 5: Frisked
Odds
Stnd.
Ratio
Error
Suspect Variable
White Male
Black Male
Hispanic Male
White Femalea
Black Female
Hispanic Female
Age
Ageb
Weight
Height
Encounter-Level Variables
Multiple People Stopped
Suspect Arrested
Engaged in Violent Crime
Known to Carry Weapon
Casing a Victim/Location
Concealed Weapon
Drug Transaction
Actions of Criminal Conduct
Acting as Lookout
Proximity of Crime
Officer Initiationa
Dispatch Initiation
C/W on Scene
Suspected Crime Descriptionb
Precinct-Level Variables
Percent Black
Percent Hispanic
Residential Instability
Concentrated Disadvantage
Violent Crime Rate
(logged)

Model 6: Searched
Odds
Stnd.
Ratio
Error

1.61*
1.75*
1.98**
--0.61*
0.68
1.03*
0.99*
1.00
1.02

0.38
0.38
0.44
--0.15
0.20
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.08

1.88**
1.74**
1.99***
--1.04
1.06
0.99
1.00
0.99
1.09

0.40
0.34
0.39
--0.23
0.27
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.07

1.06
--201.96***
60.50***
0.98
2.42***
1.70*
1.25

0.07
--29.06
28.17
0.15
0.26
0.43
0.31

0.77***
17.57***
1.63***
1.14
0.84
1.60***
1.93**
1.06

0.04
0.97
0.10
0.14
0.11
0.12
0.48
0.23

0.69
0.95
--0.80**
0.83
---

0.14
0.06
--0.07
0.08
---

0.92
0.91
--0.83**
0.97
---

0.17
0.05
--0.06
0.09
---

1.01
0.99
1.07
1.25

0.00
0.00
0.08
0.15

0.99
0.99
1.11
0.94

0.00
0.00
0.07
0.09

1.19

0.38

0.64

0.17
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(logged)
Constant
Notes

0.87

0.28

1.61
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0.43

0.16
0.25
0.06*
0.08
Reference category
b
Each model controlled for the suspected crime
descriptions. For aesthetic appeal, the results are
not reported because there are 26 different categories.
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001
a

3. Chi-Square Output
The first series of Pearson’s Chi-Square analyses examined the independent
associations between race, ethnicity, sex, and the different force outcomes. In
Table 9,2 the Chi-Square statistics for race and
ethnicity were significant for no
2
force
(χ
=9.25;
p
<.05),
handcuff
force
(χ
=9.51;
p <.01), and weapon force
(2)
(2)
2
(χ (2)=5.80; p <.05), but not other force. For sex, the Chi-Square2 results revealed
that the only significant finding was related to weapon force (χ (1)=5.90; p <.05).
Even though there were some significant differences, it must be acknowledged
that these differences were minor. White, Black, and Hispanic individuals, for
example, had handcuff force used against them 15.3%, 18.6%, and 17.2% of the
time, respectively. Similar minor differences were reported in weapon force for
race and ethnicity and the association between sex and weapon force. Related to
these findings, Cramer’s V was also reported to provide a strength of association,
or measure of correlation, between the categorical variables. “[A] value of
Cramer’s V within the range of .07–.21 indicates a small effect, a value within
the range of .21–.35 indicates a medium effect, and a value larger than .35 indicates a large effect.”197 Considering the Cramer’s V estimates were all close to
zero, the effect between race/ethnicity, sex, and use of force were negligible,
even though statistically significant.

197

Shuyan Sun, Wei Pan & Lihshing Leigh Wang, A Comprehensive Review of Effect Size
Reporting and Interpreting Practices in Academic Journals in Education and Psychology, 102
J. EDUC. PSYCH. 989, 994 (2010); see also JACOB COHEN, STATISTICAL POWER ANALYSIS FOR
THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 216–17 (2d ed. 1988).
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TABLE 9: MAIN EFFECT CHI-SQUARE RESULTS FOR USE OF FORCE
Force Outcome

Category

Race/Ethnicity Differences
No Force
White
Black
Hispanic
Handcuff
White
Force
Black
Hispanic
Weapon
White
Force
Black
Hispanic
Other Force White
Black
Hispanic
Sex Differences
No Force
Male

Handcuff
Force
Weapon
Force
Other Force

Force Incidents

842 of 1,101 (76.5%)
5,718 of 7,712 (74.1%)
2,887 of 3,760 (76.7%)
168 of 1,101(15.3%)
1,438 of 7,712 (18.6%)
645 of 3,760 (17.2%)
53 of 1,101 (4.8%)
348 of 7,712 (4.5%)
136 of 3,760 (3.6%)
38 of 1,101 (3.5%)
208 of 7,712 (2.7%)
92 of 3,760 (2.5%)

Female
Male

8,560 of 11,439
(74.8%)
887 of 1,134 (78.2%)
2,067 of 11,439
(18.1%)
184 of 1,134 (16.2%)
505 of 11,439 (4.4%)

Female
Male
Female

31 of 1,134 (2.7%)
307 of 11,439 (2.7%)
31 of 1,134 (2.7%)

Female
Male

ChiSquare(df)

Cramer’s
V

9.25(2)*

0.03

9.51(2)**

0.03

5.80(2)*

0.02

3.28(2)

0.02

2.57(1)

-0.01

2.45(1)

0.01

5.90(1)*

0.02

0.06(1)

-0.00

The second series of Chi-Square analyses focused of the joint relationship
between race/ethnicity and sex with use of force. In Table 10, the Chi-Square
statistics
for race-ethnicity-sex combinations
were significant for no force
2
2
(χ2(5)=12.28; p <.05), handcuff force 2 (χ (5)=11.84; p <.05), weapon force
(χ (5)=13.10; p <.05), and other force (χ (5)=4.30; p <.05). Similar to the results
presented in Table 9, the differences, although statistically significant, were minor. White males, Black males, Hispanic males, White females, Black females,
and Hispanic females, for instance, had weapon force used against them 5.0%,
4.7%, 3.7%, 3.8%, 2.7%, and 2.5% of the time, respectively. Similar minor differences were reported for no force, handcuff force, and other force. Even though
these findings were significant, the Cramer’s V estimates for all use of force categories were close to zero, suggesting that these relationships were negligible.198
198

Sun et al., supra note 197.
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TABLE 10: JOINT CHI-SQUARE RESULTS FOR USE OF FORCE
Force
Outcome
No
Force

Handcuff
Force

Weapon
Force

Other
Force

Category
White Male
Black Male
Hispanic Male
White Female
Black Female
Hispanic Female
White Male
Black Male
Hispanic Male
White Female
Black Female
Hispanic Female
White Male
Black Male
Hispanic Male
White Female
Black Female
Hispanic Female
White Male
Black Male
Hispanic Male
White Female
Black Female
Hispanic Female

Force Incidents
718 of 945 (75.9%)
5,181 of 7,019 (73.8%)
2,661 of 3,475 (76.6%)
124 of 156 (79.5%)
537 of 693 (77.5%)
226 of 285 (79.3%)
146 of 945 (15.4%)
1,322 of 7,019 (18.8%)
599 of 3,475 (17.2%)
22 of 156 (14.1%)
116 of 693 (16.7%)
46 of 285 (16.1%)
47 of 945 (5.0%)
329 of 7,019 (4.7%)
129 of 3,475 (3.7%)
6 of 156 (3.8%)
19 of 693 (2.7%)
7 of 285 (2.5%)
34 of 945 (3.6%)
187 of 7,019 (2.7%)
86 of 3,475 (2.5%)
4 of 156 (2.5%)
21 of 693 (3.0%)
6 of 285 (2.1%)

ChiSquare(df)

Cramer’s
V

12.28(5)*

0.03

11.84(5)*

0.03

13.10(5)*

0.03

4.30(5)*

0.02

VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Policing has witnessed tremendous innovation over the last three decades,
from developments in forensic science and body-worn cameras to widespread
use of evidence-based policing strategies (e.g., hot spots and problem-oriented
policing).199 Despite that innovation, the undercurrent of racial injustice in policing persists.200 A series of controversial police killings of people of color in 2014
199

See generally Lawrence W. Sherman, The Rise of Evidence-Based Policing: Targeting,
Testing, and Tracking, in 42 CRIME AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA, 1975-2025 (Michael Tonry ed.,
2013); KEVIN STROM, RESEARCH ON THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY ON POLICING STRATEGY IN
THE 21ST CENTURY, FINAL REPORT 4–4 to 4–13 (2016), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/gr
ants/251140.pdf [https://perma.cc/U6WR-CCWF].
200
WHITE & FRADELLA, supra note 1, at 159–61; Robert A. Brown, Policing in American
History, 16 DU BOIS REV. 189, 193 (2019); see also Keisha N. Blain, Violence in Minneapolis
Is Rooted in the History of Racist Policing in America, WASH. POST (May 30, 2020, 3:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/05/30/violence-minneapolis-is-rooted-history-racist-policing-america/ [https://perma.cc/4GYA-5QCL]; David A. Harris, Why Police
Violence Against Black People Persists—and What Can Be Done About It, FORTUNE (June 30,
2020, 4:00 PM), https://fortune.com/2020/06/30/police-violence-brutality-black-racism/ [http
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and 2015 led to public outrage, riots in some jurisdictions, and demands for police reform. The final report of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing in 2015 serves as a roadmap for reform through identification of specific
recommendations for building community trust and enhancing police accountability, and many police departments have sought to follow those recommendations.201 But five years and nine months after police in Ferguson, Missouri, killed
Michael Brown, Minneapolis police killed George Floyd.202 Floyd’s death, along
with the police killings of Breonna Taylor, Rayshard Brooks, Jacob Blake, and
others, reignited the national outrage over racial injustice in policing, demonstrated by protests across the globe, legislative efforts to reform the police at the
local, state, and federal level, and even calls to defund the police.203 The undercurrent of racial injustice has not lessened in twenty-first century policing.204
Police killings of unarmed minority citizens are the most extreme form of
racial injustice. Despite their tragic nature, available evidence suggests police
killings of citizens are rare events. For example, in 2019 police killed 999 citizens, representing a terrible outcome in a small fraction of the millions of police–

s://perma.cc/L86A-RDTT]; Liz Mineo, Why America Can’t Escape Its Racist Roots, HARV.
GAZETTE (June 4, 2020), https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2020/06/orlando-pattersonexplains-why-america-cant-escape-its-racist-roots/ [https://perma.cc/98ZL-FV2H].
201
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S
TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING 1–4 (2015), http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/TaskForce_FinalReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/SK3N-BUSN].
202
Blain, supra note 200.
203
Id.; Kevin Johnson & Kristin Phillips, ‘Perfect Storm’: Defund the Police, COVID-19 Lead
to Biggest Police Budget Cuts in Decade, USA TODAY (July 31, 2020, 1:16 PM), https://www.
usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/07/31/defund-police-covid-19-force-deepest-cop-bud
get-cuts-decade/5538397002/ [https://perma.cc/ETD2-U5ZR].
204
For an interesting discussion of why this continues, see generally Paul Oder, Opinion, Why
the Rot Runs so Deep: Racist Policing Is Indisputable, and Leaders Have Done Almost Nothing About It, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 4, 2020), https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/ny-ope
d-riots-and-protests-symptom-failure-20200604-5nbmokixlrgsvhzv4rycnt4aji-story.html [htt
ps://perma.cc/E9J2-H3WQ].
Sociologist Victor Rios and colleagues noted that some of the tensions associated with racially biased policing can be somewhat reduced with procedural justice techniques, such as
using courtesy and respect during SQF encounters. Victor M. Rios, Greg Prieto & Jonathan
M. Ibarraa, Mano Suave–Mano Dura: Legitimacy Policing and Latino Stop-and-Frisk, 85 AM.
SOC. REV. 58, 72 (2020). Still, behaviors designed to increase perceptions of police legitimacy
do not overcome civilian resistance to racialized policing strategies. Id.
We suggest that police reforms related to improving race relations between law enforcement departments and criminalized communities have to move beyond community policing and procedural justice approaches. . . . To be effective, community policing, due process, harm reduction,
and trust-building policing approaches must operate independently from such punitive strategies
[like SQF]. Departments committed to community policing might consider de-emphasizing the
stop-and-frisk and other investigatory stops as significant crime prevention strategies, and instead
promote and reward a dignity policing model that allows criminalized civilians to feel safe and
protected by officers and departmental culture.

Id.
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citizen interactions.205 Yet, the relatively rarity of such killings notwithstanding,
there is no doubt that they disproportionately impact males of racial and ethnic
minority backgrounds. Indeed, police kill Blacks at more than twice the rate that
they kill Whites.206
Other iterations of racial injustice in policing are far more frequent, and
though they do not involve a loss of life, such activities can lead to severe emotional and physical consequences for citizens and entire communities.207 Mass
surveillance SQF programs aimed at communities of color perpetuate the racial
injustice in U.S. policing.208 From 2004 through 2013, the NYPD conducted
more than five million stops of mostly Black and Hispanic New Yorkers as part
of a program that routinely violated the constitutional rights of New York’s citizenry. The misuse and abuse of stop-and-frisk in Newark, Philadelphia, Chicago,
Pittsburgh, and New York illustrates that Williams and Murphy’s “minority
view” of policing remains a stark reality.209 And the deaths of Eric Garner, Michael Brown, Freddie Gray, and most recently George Floyd, demonstrate the
centrality of stop-and-frisk to the persistent racial crisis in policing because each
encounter started with a stop-and-frisk.
New York City has been the epicenter of the racialized use of SQF. We have
re-told the New York history with SQF here, culminating in the 2013 ruling by
a federal judge that the NYPD’s program amounted to widespread unconstitutional racial profiling.210 However, most legal and scholarly attention has focused
on who gets stopped, why,211 and what the effects of such stops might be on
crime.212 What happens after the stop is a relatively untold part of the New York
SQF story. Who is most likely to be frisked or searched? Who is most likely to
have force used against them? Are there indications that the undercurrent of racial injustice persists after the stop?

205

Fatal Force, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/investigations/police-shootings-database/ [https://perma.cc/WG7U-72XV] (Apr. 16, 2021).
206
Id.; Frank Edwards, Hedwig Lee & Michael Esposito, Risk of Being Killed by Police Use
of Force in the United States by Age, Race-Ethnicity, and Sex, 116 PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI.
16793, 16794-95 (2019) (reporting that over the life course, 1 in 1,000 Black males will be
killed by police compared to 0.39 in 1,000 White males; put differently, out of 100,000 people
in the United States, 100 Black males will be killed by police compared to 39 White males).
207
WHITE & FRADELLA, supra note 1, at 108–11; Sewell, Jefferson & Lee, supra note 149, at
9.
208
WHITE & FRADELLA, supra note 1, at 108–11; see also CTR. FOR CONST. RTS., supra note
14, at 7.
209
See supra notes 67–92 and accompanying text.
210
See supra Part III.
211
See, e.g., Avdi S. Avdija, Police Stop-and-Frisk Practices: An Examination of Factors that
Affect Officers’ Decisions to Initiate a Stop-and-Frisk Police Procedure, 16 INT’L J. POLICE
SCI. & MGMT. 26, 27 (2014) (reporting on top reasons NYPD officers reported as their reasons
for initiating stops).
212
See supra note 132–145 and accompanying text.
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In our prior work, we found strong evidence of racial injustice after the stop
during the height of the NYPD SQF program.213 Our analysis of 2012 SQF data
led us to conclude: “The findings suggest that minority citizens may be exposed
to a racial or ethnic ‘double jeopardy,’ whereby they are subjected to both unconstitutional stops and disparate rates of force during those stops.”214 By 2014,
we found incremental progress in terms of an overall drop in SQF, reductions in
geographic concentration of the strategy, and increases in the efficiency of stops
as measured by higher rates of weapon and contraband seizures and higher rates
of arrest—but racial disparities persisted.215 In this Article, we fast-forward five
years and continue telling the NYPD SQF story.
A. The Increased Efficiency and Effectiveness of SQF in New York
Stops have declined precipitously in recent years, from 685,724 in 2011 to
45,788 in 2014.216 According to the NYPD’s official SQF data, there were just
13,459 stops in 2019, a 98% decrease from the height of the SQF program in
2011. By any measure, this is an enormous decline. Notably, most index crimes
remained at record-low levels in 2019, despite a slight uptick in homicides.217
Our focus here is on post-stop outcomes—frisks, searches, and use of force—but
we do note continual racial disparities among those stopped: 91% of citizens
stopped by the NYPD in 2019 were Black or Hispanic. We need research to explore the reasons behind why these disparities persist. In plain terms, are these
disparities explained by racial profiling? Or are they explained by something
else?
Our analyses allow us to comment on what happens after police stop suspects in New York City, at least according to the official data. If those data are
reliable and accurate, there have been significant improvements in the efficiency
and effectiveness of SQF in New York. Consider that in 2011, just 1.2% of stops
led to the confiscation of guns or other weapons; in 2019, that rate increased to
weapons seizures in 9.9% of encounters that started with stops. In 2012, only
6.1% of stops resulted in an arrest; in 2019, 32.1% of stops resulted in an arrest.
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Put differently, as the NYPD’s use of SQF dropped by 98%, the hit and arrest
rates increased by 725% and 426%, respectively (calculated as percent-change).
Given the low burden of proof required for a stop, these increases represent a
sea-change in the efficiency and effectiveness of reported SQFs, suggesting the
NYPD has largely abandoned its original mass-surveillance SQF program. The
NYPD’s reported use of SQF in 2019 reflects the original intent of the Terry
ruling—use of stop-and-frisk as a particularized tactic supported by reasonable
suspicion—better than any other time since the implementation of SQF.218 But
the “suspiciously low” number of stops the NYPD reported during that year suggests these findings may need to be taken with a grain of salt.219
The increases in weapon confiscations and arrests also translate into notable
changes in two of the three post-stop outcomes examined in the current study.
Though the percentage of stops accompanied by subsequent frisks has changed
little (55.9% in 2012 versus 57.4% in 2019), searches and the use of force have
both become more common. The percentage of stops resulting in full-blown
searches increased from 8.3% in 2012 to 37.5% in 2019. The increase in percentage of searches is likely tied to the increased confiscation of weapons, which
suggests far more accurate assessments of reasonable suspicion than at the height
of the SQF program, which in turn, explains the increase in the arrest percentage.
The percentage of stops in which force was used increased from 14.2% in 2012
to 25% in 2019. Prior research consistently shows use of force is more common
in encounters ending in arrest (approximately 20%).220 Thus, the increase in the
use of force by police is likely a function of the increase in arrests.
B. The Role of Race/Ethnicity and Sex in Frisk and Search Decisions
The value added by the increased efficiency and effectiveness of SQF could
be undermined by continued racial disparities in frisks and searches. We noted
above that racial disparities persist in those who were stopped (91% were Black
or Hispanic, 61% and 30%, respectively), and those disparities carry over to who
was frisked and searched. Of the 7,213 frisks conducted, 93.3% involved Black
or Hispanic citizens (62.5% and 30.8%, respectively). Of the 4,655 searches conducted, 90.8% involved Black or Hispanic citizens (59.2% and 31.6%, respectively). Males are the disproportionate targets of stops (91%), and that also persists with frisks (95.3%) and searches (92.6%). What explains the racial/ethnic
218

Law professors David Rudovsky and David A. Harris argue that empirical data, like hit
rates, “can provide police departments with critical information regarding the most salient
predictors of criminal conduct and weapon possession.” David Rudovsky & David A. Harris,
Terry Stops-and-Frisks: The Troubling Use of Common Sense in a World of Empirical Data,
79 OHIO STATE L.J. 501, 545 (2018). We agree wholeheartedly. But empirical findings are
only as good as the data collected and analyzed. Given the “suspiciously low” reported number
of NYPD stops in 2019, Khan, supra note 15, we would be wary of policies being created
around the factors associated with the hit rates from that year.
219
Khan, supra note 15. See generally supra Section IV.F.
220
Matthew J. Hickman, Alex R. Piquero & Joel H. Garner, Toward a National Estimate of
Police Use of Nonlethal Force, 7 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 563, 563 (2008).

21 NEV. L.J. 1151

1204

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 21:3

and sex disparities in frisks and searches? When controlling for other relevant
factors, are citizen race/ethnicity and sex significant predictors of who gets
frisked and searched?
Results from our multi-level regression models show that, when controlling
for other relevant encounter- and precinct-level variables, citizen race/ethnicity
is not a significant predictor of getting frisked or getting searched; Black and
Hispanic citizens were no more likely to be frisked or searched than White citizens. Rather, frisk and search decisions are explained by a series of encounterlevel variables, most notably weapon carrying and suspected engagement in violent crime and drug transactions.221 Citizen sex (male) and age (younger) also
predict frisk and search decisions. The importance of citizen sex is also reflected
in the joint-effects models: females of any race/ethnicity are less likely to be
frisked and searched than males, and race/ethnicity only comes into play when
comparing males and females across racial/ethnic categories, with one exception:
Hispanic males are more likely to be searched compared to White males.
No precinct-level variables predict frisk or stop decisions either. The percent
of residents that are Black or Hispanic in a precinct is not associated with frisk
and search decisions, nor are measures of concentrated disadvantage and
crime.222
Prior research has demonstrated the disproportionate effects of SQF on minority communities,223 and our analyses do not explore this important issue (i.e.,
who is stopped and why). However, we can say with some degree of certainty
that social ecology does not influence who gets frisked or searched; thus, the
social ecological factors that may contribute to ongoing racial disparities appear
to concern the decision to initiate a stop.
Overall, and again assuming the validity of the NYPD’s 2019 SQF data, the
race/ethnicity findings from post-stop outcomes are positive. Though Black and
Hispanic New Yorkers still disproportionately felt the effects of SQF in 2019,
citizens’ race/ethnicity did not explain who was frisked or searched by NYPD
officers. This finding is especially important when coupled with the findings
above on the enhanced efficiency and effectiveness of stops.
C. The Role of Race/Ethnicity and Sex in Use of Force Decision-Making
Our conclusions about the use of force are constrained by the simplicity of
the analyses and the infrequency of the outcome. Parsing out the relatively few
221
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use-of-force cases across citizen race/ethnicity and sex short-circuits our ability
to employ multi-level regression modeling. At the descriptive level, the differences in the use of force across race/ethnicity and sex appear negligible and practically non-significant, as evidenced by the Cramer’s V values. For example, of
the 7,712 Black citizens who were stopped, 348 (4.5%) experienced weapon
force. Of the 3,760 Hispanic citizens who were stopped, 136 (3.6%) experienced
weapon force. And of the 1,101 White citizens who were stopped, 53 (4.8%)
experienced weapon force. Still, given the racial/ethnic disparities among those
stopped, Black and Hispanic citizens experienced most uses of force. In fact, of
the 3,126 stops in which NYPD officers reporting using some level of force,
1,994 (63.9%) involved Black citizens and 873 (27.9%) involved Hispanic citizens. Thus, a whopping 91.8% of the total uses of force in 2019 occurred against
Blacks and Hispanics.224 These seemingly contradictory findings on use of force
are explained by the sheer differences in the volume of stops of Black and Hispanic citizens. Future research should explore the interplay between citizen
race/ethnicity and use of force by including additional years of data that would
support the requisite multi-level regression modeling.
D. Final Thoughts
The undercurrent of racial injustice in policing persists in 2020, and the misuse of stop-and-frisk remains one of the most prominent features of that phenomena. During the 1990s and 2000s, the NYPD’s use of SQF epitomized this racial
injustice, but the available evidence suggests much has changed since Judge
Scheindlin’s ruling in 2013. The number of stops has declined dramatically, as
has the geographic concentration of those stops.225 Weapons confiscations and
arrests have increased dramatically, and results of our analyses show that, in
2019, Black and Hispanic citizens were no more likely to be frisked or searched
than White citizens (when controlling for relevant encounter- and precinct-level
factors). Still, racial disparities persist in who is stopped, and questions remain
about racial disparities in the use of force during SQF encounters.
Based on our examination of SQF data in 2014, we concluded: “In sum, the
findings presented here show that the NYPD has made significant progress since
2011, and the proper mechanisms are in place to ensure that the department will
continue to move toward widespread constitutional policing.”226 The results from
2019 show continued progress in post-stop outcomes, but the NYPD still has
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work to do to address racial and ethnic disparities that persist with regard to the
people who get stopped in the first place.227
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